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1 Introduction
Traditionally, formal linguistic approaches have assumed that affective stance
(Ochs 1992, Jaffe 2009) is not part of a linguistic expression’s semantics,
although recent approaches have sought to integrate stance and other aspects of
social discourse into semantic approaches (McConnell-Ginet 2002, 2006, 2008;
Potts 2003, 2005). In this paper I will outline some of the definitional and
methodological areas of concern in current stance research.
I will also explore how stancetaking is “done” on the lexicosyntactic level and
argue that empirical evidence from lexicosyntactic variation and discourse
suggests that affect is part of what speakers commit themselves to when they
utter a statement containing a semantically “double-barreled” (Zwicky 2003,
p. 84) term.
The empirical enquiry and definitional concerns provide a motivation for
integrating stance into semantic/pragmatic models; I shall consider what sorts of
semantic/pragmatic description can accommodate stance–commitments and
argue that we should look to Sally McConnell-Ginet’s tripartite account of lexical
significance as a possible model for the integration of stance into semantics
(McConnell-Ginet 2002, 2006, 2008).
Along the way, I will look at what consequences this has in terms of knowledge
distribution for social kind terms; and outline some directions for future stance
research, including a quick look at what an analysis of reclamatory language use
(Zwicky 2003) might have to offer.
2 Let’s stance
Although several definitions of stance have been offered in the sociolinguistics
and linguistic anthropology literature (see Jaffe 2009 for an overview), I shall rely
primarily on the definition given by Elinor Ochs (1992), which is based on
indexicality.
Page 7 of 146
2.1 So what are stance and affect when they’re at home?Exam number: 6388940
Stance: linguistic and social resources that can be employed in a directly or
indirectly indexical manner to perform a particular pragmatic attitude or
social action (Ochs 1992, p. 342).
.
On Ochs’s framework, certain clusters of stances can jointly constitute a social
role.
The sociolinguistic notion of stance is not well–defined, although it has a great
deal of explanatory power. In the sociolinguistic tradition, the explanatory power
of stance has been exploited in both discursive and variationist approaches. In
discursive approaches, stance may be used to explain situated meaning — that is,
how and why interlocutors orient to particular propositions in context, and how
these contribute to the building of identity (Moore & Podesva 2009). In
variationist approaches, stance may be used to explain how we get from
frequencies (first–order indexicality) to social meaning (second– and third– order)
— these are research questions that underpin the work such as that done by
Eckert (2005), Labov (2010), Leslie and James Milroy (Milroy & Milroy 2010),
and others.
It should be noted here that indexical in this context is the sociolinguistic notion
of indexicality, not the traditional semantic notion of indexical terms such as
here, you, me, etc. In this paper, I will rely on the sociolinguistic notion of
indexicality, according to which we say that the relationship between identity and
and sociolinguistic variables becomes indexical when it becomes “imbued with
meaning drawn from local ideology” (Johnstone & Kiesling 2008, p. 7; see also
Eckert 1996, Ochs 1992).
2.1 So what are stance and affect when they’re at home?
Stance is the way sociolinguists talk about affect and “pragmatic attitude”
(Ochs 1992, p. 342) in interaction; as a way of modelling the connection
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between an utterance and the social action it may realise. This should not be
confused with speech act theory (Austin 1975, Geis 1995), although they bear
several similarities, and I will treat them as parallel research directions.
Presumably all of the sentences below1 are about the same attribute of Ayisha’s,
but in each case the speaker has a different attitude towards the attribute:
(1) a. Ayisha is obstinate.
b. Ayisha is stubborn.
c. Ayisha is pigheaded.
None of the sentences are generally taken to be positive (at least compared to,
say, calling someone tenacious), but example (c) seems much more negative than
(a) or (b). Of course context will change the way that a hearer might interpret
these, but it seems plausible to say that, all else being equal, it is kinder to
Ayisha to describe her as stubborn than as pigheaded.
Since obstinate, stubborn, and pigheaded all pick out the same attribute, the
difference between them seems to be one of affect — that is, the emotional
content of a term. If the speaker uses clusters of linguistic features to express
their attitude relative to the the attribute in context, that is stance, and
affect–laden lexical items may be one such type of linguistic feature. I will use
the term affect for the emotional or attitudinal content of a term; and I shall use
the term stance to talk about the interactional effects that indexicality and affect
may realise in context.
2.2 A discursive view
There are two senses of discourse that must be distinguished:
(linguistic) discourse: a communicative event.
(social/societal) discourse: ”sets of propositions in circulation about a
1This example is Jeffrey Ketland’s, and I am grateful to him for his permission to include it.
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particular phenomenon, which constitute what people take to be the reality
of the phenomenon” (Cameron & Kulick 2003, p. 16).
These two senses of discourse are connected in that they are a least partly
mutually constitutive. Social discourses, a notion that comes from critical theory,
is made up of many instances of communicative events. Similarly, individual
communicative events may draw on social discourses for their context and
background assumptions — a point that Kitzinger 2005 builds on in her
argument that heterosexuality is “backgrounded” by the quotidian use of family
relationship labels such as “my wife” in ordinary conversational interaction. This,
Kitzinger argues, is connected to broader discourses about family structure and
marriage, and it’s these broader discourses that are brought into play that can
trigger interactional difficulty if the expression “my wife” is used by a woman.
2.3 Indexicality
On Johnstone and Kiesling’s schema, a first–order indexical is a feature that
correlates with some particular sociodemographic group (2008, p. 8). A
first–order indexical becomes a second–order indexical when it “become[s]
available for social work” (p. 8) and speakers can attribute social significance to
the feature, or use it to identify speakers as having a particular identity.
Second–order indexicals become third–order indexicals when it can be used as
part of an explicit performance, serious or ironic, of a particular identity. While
not all indexical linguistic strategies are equally available to all speakers (Podesva
et al 2008), the use of certain features as third–order indexicals is available to
speakers for whom it is not a first–order indexical. Johnstone and Kiesling 2008
discuss the case of /aw/–monophthongization in Pittsburgh English: use of
/aw/–monophthongization is higher among working-class men in Pittsburgh, but
/aw/–monophthongized words like “dahtahn” are printed on T-shirts and other
souvenirs as examples of “Pittsburghese”; so speakers who are not working-class
male Pittsburghers can and do use the feature, either seriously or playfully, in
order to sound more “local”.
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Clusters of stances may jointly constitute social roles. Ochs (1992) makes this
argument with regard to accommodating and nurturing stances (which, she
argues, are in turn constituted by features of linguistic accommodation in speech
to children by their caregivers) jointly constituting White Western middle-class
motherhood. In other words, on Ochs’s view, it is possible to indexically link
child–directed speech with a motherhood role. Following Johnstone and
Kiesling’s argument, we can also point out that this indexical link is available to
non-mothers in order to perform social work. For example, if I were to say “Now,
now, play nicely together” to some rowdy colleagues, I risk sounding
condescending (perhaps playfully so), because of the way in which such an
utterance (and certain deliveries, such as the use of phonological simplification
and other features of addressee–focussed speech) is indexically connected to
child–directed speech; my colleagues would recognise these features, although I
am not myself a mother.
How best to describe indexicality and stance is a point of ongoing debate among
linguists, as some linguists argue there is a particular primacy to certain social
variables (Meyerhoff, forthcoming), and others arguing that indexing is a matter
of style and register (Eckert 2005). A particular point that requires closer
attention in these debates is salience — Johnstone & Kiesling’s 2008 schema is
closely tied to levels of awareness among speakers. However, as Meyerhoff
(forthcoming) notes, some social attributes such as gender may be salient in
terms of how community life is organised, but may not be significant for many
linguistic variables, as in the case of the Bequia speech community where
Meyerhoff and her collaborators have consistently found more significant results
for variation according to village than for gender, when investigating a range of
linguistic variables.
In order to answer the question of why some variables come to be “imbued with
meaning drawn from local ideology” (Johnstone & Kiesling 2008, p. 7), it seems
that linguists need a clearer notion of linguistic salience. However, Meyerhoff’s
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findings seem to be a warning against being too quick to assume that
sociopolitical salience will necessarily translate into statistically significant
variation for a particular linguistic variable.
2.4 Definitional problems
The lack definitional clarity for stance is due to a number of factors:
1. Social range: the range of indexicalities performable by a feature (Agha
2005, p. 39)2. Since stances are constituted by clusters of socially–coded
features, each of which may present a range of performable indexicalities,
individuating stances may not be a straightforward matter.
2. Social domain: the domain of people to whom the stance is recognisable
(Agha 2005, p. 40). The social domain may not precisely map the set of
speakers who are licensed to perform a feature (Podesva et al 2008).
3. Licensing: some strategies for stancetaking might not be equally available
to all speakers (Podesva et al 2008). Use of an indexical feature does not
mean that the feature is straightforwardly “switched on”, nor does using
more of a feature that indexes, say, intelligence, necessarily mean that the
speaker will be perceived as more articulate. The work of Podesva et al
(2008) on /t/ realisations shows that speakers may “overshoot” in their
production of indexical variants, and then be perceived as not being
genuine, rather than as having more intelligence.
4. Vagueness: a feature may index vague attributes such as “masculinity”, or
“local identity”, as in Johnstone & Kiesling’s work (2008).
5. Situatedness: the notion of situated meaning which pervades stance
research — especially in the linguistic anthropology tradition — is the idea
that elements of social significance arise in dynamic situations as a product
of interaction in a particular fleeting context, and cannot be isolated from
that context.
2Agha 2005 is discussing registers, but I take the same discussion to be applicable, mutatis
mutandum, for sociolinguistic resources that constitute a stance.
Page 12 of 146
2.4 Definitional problems Exam number: 6388940
Some linguists argue that stance is always situated, whereas others would want
to recognise situated meaning as having certain special properties; so any
account of stance must at the very least, remain compatible with situated
meaning.3 I would argue that stance can benefit from clarification without losing
its explanatory power with regard to situated meaning, and the dangers of not
doing so are serious. In particular, linguists should be concerned that study of
situated meaning does not become permissive of research that is not fully
testable, and repeatable, or of work that is “mind–reading”.
The danger of poorly–defined notions is that they may lead to methodological
sloppiness, and deviate significantly from the scientific method, even if they have
explanatory power. I have outlined above a few examples in the literature where
it seems to me that this change has led to problematic developments in stance
research, and as a result, it seems that there are strong advantages to a
clarification of stance and stance research methodologies.
Intention analyses
These are analyses that are premised on the idea that we can know or gain access
to a speaker’s intentions or mental states through linguistic analysis. Some
linguists, such as Anna Wierzbicka go so far as to argue that an analysis of
mental states is not only possible, but actually necessary for semantic analysis, in
her work on speech act verbs from a second–language acquisition perspective
(1987). She argues that
‘first person mental phrases are not only more common than third
person ones: they are also more basic, semantically. ‘I want’ is more
basic than “he wants,” and “I feel” is more basic than “she feels”’
(1987, p. 15).
3Thanks to Emma Moore for helpful discussion on this point
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However, it is not at all clear what it means for a mental phrase to be
semantically “more basic”, since the criteria Wierzbicka gives are syntactic and
epistemological: she asserts that people cannot be wrong about what they
themselves want or feel (but see Descartes 1996) and this is reflected by first
person mental phrases being less grammatically complex in some languages, such
as Japanese and Hua. However, this claim is highly problematic: Firstly, syntactic
complexity in some languages does not necessarily license the conflation of
epistemic concerns (about what it is possible for me to know about my mental
states, and the mental states of others) with syntactic criteria (about the
grammatical complexity of particular constructions). Secondly, neither of these
are semantic criteria, so there is some danger of a category error.
Intention analyses present a range of philosophical problems and are epistemically
vulnerable since speakers’ intentions are mental states to which linguists have no
access.
Omnipresence analyses
These are analyses that are premised on the idea that certain attributes (eg,
gender, power, etc) must always be relevant in any given dataset or discourse.
Schegloff (1997) discusses this problem at length, and notes the need for more
rigorous approaches in order to ground conversation analysis and critical
discourse analysis firmly in what the speakers themselves orient to, and in the
linguistic form of their discourse, and he warns against permitting linguistic
analysis to become “merely ideological” (1997, p. 183).
Essentialist analyses
These are analyses that are premised on the assumption that a speaker’s
sociodemographic group membership determines their speech in all contexts, and
by extension, that broad sociodemographic categories (eg, gender) are sufficient
to explain linguistic features. Kira Hall (2003) discusses a discourse transcription
used in two different publications for starkly different conclusions:
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What kind of salad dressing should I make?Mike:
Oil and vinegar, what else?Ken:
What do you mean “what else?”Mike:
Well, I always make oil and vinegar, but if you want, weKen:
could try something else.
Does that mean you don’t like it when I make otherKen:
dressings?
No, I like it. Go ahead. Make something else.Mike:
I don’t. Make a yoghurt dressing.Ken:
Mike makes yoghurt dressing, tastes it, and makes a
face.
Isn’t it good?Ken:
I don’t know how to make yoghurt dressing.Mike:
Well, if you don’t like it, throw it out.Ken:
Never mind.Mike:
What never mind? It’s just a little yoghurt.Ken:
You’re making a big deal about nothing.Mike:
You are!Ken:
(From Tannen 1986, p. 119)
Tannen presents the interaction between two male partners as an example of
self–deprecating humour that was not understood by one of the interlocutors,
leading to a disagreement. But as Hall points out, in Burrell and Fitzpatrick
(1989), the interlocutors are presented as Bob and Joanne instead of Mike and
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Ken; and the authors couch their analysis in terms of traditional gender roles.
Hall points out is not at all clear how the interaction between two men came to
be recast as an interaction between different-sex partners, but the fact that the
interaction can be “straightened” at all, and still be read as a plausible
conversation shows the gendered element that Burrell and Fitzpatrick highlight is
not inherent to the original text at all and is and certainly nothing that the
speakers themselves orient to.
However the recasting of the original couple as a heterosexual couple came about,
this case highlights that linguists must be much more careful about attributing
particular linguistic usage to sociodemographic group membership without careful
consideration of what a falsifying case would look like (Popper 1998)
2.4.1 The demarcation of science
The philosopher of science Karl Popper argues that falsifiability is the primary
distinction between scientific theories and pseudoscientific accounts (1998); he
gives the examples of Einsteinian physics, in contrast to Marx’s accounts of
history and class struggle. One should not, Popper argues, search for verification
of a claim — any Marxist can point out countless examples that support Marx’s
claims, because even strikingly different situations can be explained by Marx’s
account: if people in deprived areas of England riot, it can be explained by saying
that they are alienated (Marx 1844); if some other equally–deprived young people
do not riot, this can be explained by saying they are under false consciousness.
Consequently, almost any situation can be seen as confirmation of Marx’s
account.
By contrast, Einstein’s theory of relativity made testable predictions, that were
“incompatible with certain possible results of observation” (Popper 1998, p. 6,
emphasis original).
Instead of seeking confirmation of a theory, therefore, Popper argues that one
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should seek to refute a theory, which he explains as:
1. “[...] Confirmations should count only if they are the result of
risky predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened by the theory
in question, we should have expected an event which was
incompatible with the theory – an event which would have
refuted the theory.
2. Every ‘good’ scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain
things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is.
3. A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is
non–scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as
people often think) but a vice.
4. Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or
refute it. Testability is falsifiability; but there are degrees of
testability: some theories are more testable, more exposed to
refutation, than others; they take, as it were, greater risk.
5. Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the
result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means it can be
presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the
theory (I now speak in such cases of ‘corroborating evidence’).”
(From Popper 1998, p. 7. Emphasis original)
Thomas Kuhn also discussed the psychological tendency to seek out verification
in his work on the shortcomings of the scientific method. He argues that
although we would want science to be objective and unified, advances in science
(“scientific revolutions”) are frequently neither (1996). Scientific revolution are
much better described as decisions between incommensurable paradigms than
objective decisions between comparable theories. This is strikingly similar to the
anthropology and linguistic anthropology literature on subjectivity, which
concerns itself with the ways in which a researcher views data through the lens of
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their subjective experience, and the extent to which it is possible for researchers
to detach themselves from their subjectivity (see, for example, Kulick & Wilson
1995). Kuhn’s claims are descriptive not prescriptive, so he does not advocate
subjectivity, but rather notes it as a tendency of human psychology (1996).
My concern here is that some stance research may be deviating from the
falsifiability principle of scientific method, and tending more towards embracing
subjectivity. In light of the falsifiability criterion, it would seem that sociolinguists
are right to struggle with questions of what constitutes explanatory adequacy for
studies on style, stance, identity, and variation, as it is not always clear what
would count as falsifiability when considering many of these questions.4
There are also reasons to be concerned with the clarification of these notions
within semantics, given the extent to which previous work has relied on speakers’
mental states, and the extent to which semantics methodologies have made use
of intuition. A more detailed overview of these problems will be undertaken in
Section 6.1.
Despite methodological concerns, however, there has been an ongoing program
of research in semantics and pragmatics to understand the interactional effects of
certain sentences and sentence forms. For example, Sadock & Zwicky 1985 are
concerned with how to explain clause types and their associated force. As
mentioned above, I will treat this development in semantics/pragmatics work as a
parallel research program to stance research.
In other words, it seems that semanticists have been working towards a
comparable understanding of utterances as effecting certain kinds of interactional
work as sociolinguists have, but through different methods and working from
different premises, and with little cross-fertilisation between the subdisciplines. It
is my aim here to create a little common ground between the sociolinguistic and
semantic accounts of the mechanisms that underly this interactional work, and in
4Thanks to Lauren Hall-Lew and the participants of the Sociolinguistics Reading Group for
productive conversations on this topic.
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doing so, to clarify some of these concepts.
2.4.2 Possible applications
An ancillary advantage to the clarification of stance would be practical
applications as well as theoretical clarification. These applications are beyond the
scope of this dissertation, but I have sketched them here as motivation for
definitional clarification.
The clarification of stance in semantic and pragmatic terms also opens the
possibility of formalising it, and applying it for computational use in the long run.
I shall not attempt this here, but potential applications might include machine
summarisation, and similar computational problems.
Another practical application, in the long run, might be a clearer understanding
of high-affect terms in legal domains. For example, a recent employment dispute
between the train operator Arwyn Thomas, and his employer, the London
Underground, hung on whether Thomas had been abusive in calling another
member of staff a “scab” and a “strikebreaker”. Thomas was dismissed by
London Underground under gross misconduct regulations, but he maintained that
he had been victimised for his trade union activities, and had been unfairly
dismissed (Thomas v London Underground 2011). It is possible that a clearer
understanding of wether and how high–affect terms are taken to commit speakers
to particular stances might have been helpful in this case, and other cases that
turn on instances of stancetaking in the field of language and the law.
2.5 Sociolinguistic and empirical approaches to stance
Traditionally, studies on stance have drawn primarily on discursive methods,
although there is an increasing move to combine discursive and empirical
methods. For example, MOORE AND PODESVA 2009 use a combination of
statistical and discursive methods in order to comment on both the distribution
of tag questions among British teenagers, and the interactional contexts in which
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they occur. Similarly, Adachi uses a similar approach for her investigation on
compliments among young Japanese adults (2011). Such methods allow the
authors to discuss not only the frequency and significance of the features they
investigate, but also their contexts, and how the occurrence of the features in
context can be seen as performatively realising certain social categories.
Stuart-Smith and her colleagues use a combination of discursive methods,
together with Labovian methods such as word lists, in their investigation of
media influence in TH-fronting among Glasgow teenagers (2010). They argue
that media influence of the teenagers’ speech is due to their stance to mass
media programmes such as East Enders, and this results in TH-fronting in
liminoid situations. That is, the realisation of voiceless5 interdental fricatives as
labiodental:
(2) Non-fronted: I’d do any[T]ing for love, but I won’t listen to Meat Loaf.
TH-fronted: I’d do any[f]ing for love, but I won’t listen to Meat Loaf.
Recent work on stance and indexicality has also focused on experimental
approaches, although many of these have been focused primarily on
sociophonetic variation. Johnstone & Kiesling 2008 work consisted of asking
participants to evaluate sentences containing /aw/–monophthongized lexemes,
and use this work as a basis to develop their indexicality schema. Podesva and
his collaborators used an experimental approach to both production and
perception of /t/ realisation in the speech of US politicians (Podesva et al 2008),
and found that the released variant seemed to be available for use by politicians
to create an “articulate” persona.
While there has been extensive work on on phonetic and phonological variation
as a vehicle for stance (including , Johnstone & Kiesling 2008, Labov 2010,
Podesva et al 2008, Stuart-Smith 2010), there has been surprisingly little work
5Stuart-Smith is dealing only with voiceless TH-fronting, but cases of voiced TH-fronting are
also attested in some UK dialects, including my own.
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on other types of linguistic features for as vehicles for stance and indexicality.
Somasundaran and Wiebe’s work on stance identification in online ideological
debates focuses on lexical choice (2010); Meyerhoff’s work (forthcoming) on
place in Bequian English investigates a range of morphosyntactic features; and
Moore and Podesva discuss the role of tag questions as indexes. However, there
has been surprisingly little research on lexicosyntactic features as vehicles for
stance, with an exception of Hall-Lew and Norcliffe’s (2006) work on ethnonyms
(ethnicity labels such as Turk, Chinese, Welsh). The current research aims to
redress this gap in the literature by focussing primarily on lexicosyntactic
phenomena.
Type Example Characteristics
I German Regular singular/plural opposition.
Same declensional properties as most common nouns.
II French, Scottish Formed with –ish/–sh/–ch suffix.
Only plural–collective usage; no formal singular.
IIIa Japanese, Chinese Formed by the –ese suffix.
Singular and plural are formally identical.
IIIb Swiss, Manx Ethnonyms ending in sibilants that have the same
formal characteristics as Type IIIa.
(Some dictionaries do allow regular plurals for some
Type IIIb words with –es suffix.)
IV Zulu, Arawak Can be declined according to either Type I or Type III
model (with or without overt plural suffix).
Table 1: Table showing a typology of ethnonym declensions, from Tuite 1995, pp.
491–492.
Hall-Lew &Norcliffe (2006) rely on Tuite’s (1995) typology of ethnonyms, above,
and note that mass plurals are not grammatical for individual, discrete or
enumerated entities:
(3) *I ate rices for dinner.
(4) *There are fifty cereals in the breakfast bowl.
(5) ?There five French in the restaurant.
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Hall-Lew and Norcliffe’s study investigated the use of ethnonyms in singular,
plural, collective plural, and enumerated plural (with different numbers)
environments. They found that, for ethnonyms where grammaticality depended
on number, politeness also depended on number (2006, p. 35). They note that
this supports the idea that “grammaticality and politeness judgements may be
correlated for English ethnonyms” (2006, p. 33). Where grammaticality did not
depend on number, politeness varied according to lexical cluster. They also found
variation according to age and dialect, but not gender (p. 36).
Somasundaran and Wiebe discuss a formal approach to recognising stance in
online ideological argumentation (2010). They characterise stance in terms of
“sides” for and against in argumentation, such as for–existence of God. They
note that “unigrams are reliable for stance classification in political domains”
(2010, p. 121), remarking that,
“Intuitively, evoking a particular topic can be indicative of a stance.
For example, a participant who chooses to speak about “child” and
“life” in an abortion debate is more likely from an against–abortion
side, while someone speaking about “woman”, “rape” and “choice”
is more likely from a for–abortion stance” (Somasundaran & Wiebe
2010, p. 121).
Somasundaran and Wiebe’s labelling of argument sides seems to be driven by
statistics rather than by ethnography, in that whether someone who opposes
restrictions on abortion should be described as “for” abortion, or “for” choice, is
an ideologically–laden decision, and situates the speaker in relation to a set of
social discourses. To my ears at least, “pro-abortion” is a label that people tend
not to pick for themselves, although political opponents may use it to speak
about them, which suggests that the labelling of stances can itself be associated
with particular discourses and with affect, although this claim would need to be
tested. In this sense, competing discourse may not be “equal and opposite”,
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since opposition to the stance or its accompanying discourse may come in the
form of opposing the premises of an argument, rather than simply disagreeing
with the conclusion. I will explore how this insight might raise some interesting
questions for work on reclamatory language in Section 9.5, but it is worth noting
here that this may have immediate empirical consequences in that semantically
similar words may not necessarily correspond to the same argument side:
“we do not see a clear separation of the terms (for e.g.,“bible” is an
indicator for against-gay rights while “christianity” is an indicator for
for–gay rights)” (Somasundaran & Wiebe 2010, p. 122).
What Somasundaran and Wiebe note as a lack of clear separation of terms might
in fact be indicative of salient semantic difference for the speakers, and indeed I
will argue that this is the case.
2.6 Theoretical approaches to stance
The exploration of stance from the theoretical linguistics subdisciplines is
somewhat underdeveloped, but some avenues of investigation appear promising.
In general the relevant semantics literature does not address stance and
(sociolinguistic) indexicality using the framework that sociolinguists use, but
nevertheless, there is ongoing work on similar ideas. The phenomenon of affective
variation according to lexical and social categorisation has been noted by several
linguists, especially by Arnold Zwicky, who has noted speakers’ affective attitudes
as an important issue for semantic problems (1974, 1997a, 1997b, 2003). In
particular, Zwicky remarks that different affective content may be associated
with gayAdj and gayN , and that the affective variation by grammatical category
may extent to straight, queer and Jew(ish) (1997a, pp. 22–23), but he does not
offer a semantic/pragmatic characterisation of the issues that he identifies.
Christopher Potts has gives an account of expressives as conventional
implicatures (2003, 2005), to which Kent Bach responds (1999, 2006); and I shall
Page 23 of 146
Exam number: 6388940
review both Potts’s account and Bach’s response in Section 8. I will argue that
Potts has overlooked crucial features of the referential component of high–affect
terms, and adopt Bach’s analysis of apparent–conventional implicatures.
However, I will also argue that expressives have important consequences for a
traditional view of the demarcation between semantics and pragmatics.
Perhaps working most closely to the sociolinguistic framework I have outlined
above, Sally McConnell-Ginet argues that social significance should be considered
to be part of the semantics of words like marriage, where salient sociopolitical
discourses exist (2002, 2006, 2008). I will respond to McConnell-Ginet’s
argument in Section 11.
Geis develops an account of what he calls “conversational competence” (1995, p.
xi) in which he argues that what, on an Austinian view, we might consider to be
performative speech acts (Austin 1975) such as requesting or promising are social
rather than linguistic actions (pace Sadock & Zwicky 1985), and that making
this distinction reduces the need to “associate the performance of particular
speech acts with the uttering of sentences having particular linguistic forms”
(Geis 1995, p. xii). Geis aims to revise the traditional view of speech act
structure; and critiques traditional speech act theory on the basis that speech
acts lack the appropriate (linguistic) individuation conditions.
3 “What do you mean by that?” Some remarks on meaning
There is extensive empirical sociolinguistic research to motivate taking seriously
the idea of linguistically-encoded conceptual baggage (Eckert 2005, Podesva et al
2008, Stuart-Smith 2010, and others).
However variation according to speaker, speech community or community of
practice, and context suggests that at least some elements of conceptual baggage
cannot be truth-conditional unless one is prepared to accommodate a very large
and unwieldy amount of relativisation. Even so, some degree of relativisation is
not terribly controversial — indeed, relativisation is built into systems such as
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Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp & Reyle 1993), and the claim that
context shapes discourse is widely accepted by computational and theoretical
linguists as well as by sociolinguists.
However, some sociolinguists make a much stronger claim than an argument for
relativisation for context. For example the work of Susan Ehrlich (2007) and Jan
Blommaert (2005) suggests that not only does context change as speakers make
certain things more or less salient by adding to what is in the common ground;
but rather that the context itself is discursively constructed. This makes
relativising to context in order to accommodate for this notion an intractable
prospect indeed, and is surely not what Kamp and Reyle 1993 had in mind.
Linguists working in a semantic or pragmatic framework have differed on whether
stance should be thought of as truth-conditional. I will return to this issue and
explore its consequences for the status of stance and the semantic–pragmatic
distinction in Section 11.
4 Sociopolitical identity labels
While there is an extensive and growing body of literature on language and
ethnicity, sexuality, politics, and similar topics, there is comparatively less
linguistic work focussed specifically on identity labels. I have chosen to focus my
study on identity labels (gay, black, etc) which can be used in both affective
ways and straightforwardly referential ways, as a way of exploring stance through
lexicosyntactic variation and the implications for semantic/pragmatic description
when dealing with terms that have both referential and affective components.
The linguistic issues that have been raised in previous linguistics work include the
following:
• semantic “double-barrel[ing]” (Zwicky 2003, p. 84) of identity labels: this
is when terms have both a referential component and an affective
component.
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• language and identity: the emergence and maintenance of group and
individual identities through linguistic practice. This include local
community-based identities but also debates about the extent to which
broader categories like “gay”, “African American”, or “woman” can or
should be thought of as corresponding to a set of linguistic practices (see,
for example, Kulick 2000).
• renaming and reclaiming (Cameron 1985, Cameron & Kulick 2003, Zwicky
2003)
• semantic derogation of terms that are indexed with social identities that
have low or problematic social status, such as the pejoration of mistress
because of its association with the social status of women (Schultz 1975)
• construction of in-group and out-group identities (Cameron & Kulick 2003)
• folk taxonomies (Zwicky 1997a)
My enquiry will be focused primarily on the first of these. Approaches to these
topics has changed considerably since the early work on language and identity in
that, where labelling according to sociodemographic group membership used to
be seen as an essentialist, deterministic matter by linguists, there has been a
move in recent years to consider these categories to be matters of sociopolitical
performance within certain normative conditions (Cameron & Kulick 2003,
Kulick 2003).
It is important to note that these labels are not natural kind terms. They are
social kind terms (see Haslanger 2000 for a detailed exploration of social kind
terms) — terms for groups that are socially constructed. This means that the
type of sociopolitical identities that are salient in a given context are culturally
contingent: for example, black is a salient ethnicity category in the UK, in a way
that Hispanic is not — Hispanic is not commonly a listed option on British racial
equality monitoring forms, and is frequently confused with Caribbean. In the
USA, the distinction between Hispanic and Caribbean is a salient one, but the
distinction between, say, Welsh and British might not be. It would be
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methodologically naive to assume that identity labels are deterministic.
Cameron and Kulick (2003; Kulick 2002) have argued for a move to studying
performativity and desire within language and gender and sexuality research,
precisely as a way of moving away from relying on naively–labelled categories.
While I have not taken up that approach here, I will discuss the problematisation
of identity labels in Section 10.
4.1 Neutrality
The usage of lexicosyntactic constructions containing identity labels is the focus
of strong lay speaker ideologies, and these are often expressed both explicitly and
implicitly in mass media and institutional discourse, as well as in lay speaker
conversation. For example, the American English lexical shifts from negro, to
coloured, to black, to Black, to ethnicity-focused terms such as African
American, to person of colour, highlights a complex relationship between political
and linguistic norms. In such a context, it is not at all clear that there exist
neutral choices of lexicosyntactic construction.
5 Hypotheses
My hypotheses, each with its corresponding H0 formulation, are as follows:
Hypothesis 1: I expect to see consistent, and statistically significant,
association between intra-linguistic features and acceptability judgements
H01 : There will be no statistically significant pattern in participants’
identification of intra-linguistic features and acceptability judgements.
Hypothesis 2: I expect intra-linguistic features that are identified as polite not
to be identified as offensive and vice-versa; and for intra-linguistic features
that are identified as polite to also be selected for friend use and
acquaintance use.
H02 : There will be no statistically significant relationship between
intra-linguistic features that are judged as polite, and how those features
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are judged for offensiveness, friend use, and acquaintance use.
Hypothesis 3: I expect to see evidence of linguistic features being used to mark
social distance: that is, consistent, and statistically significant, distinctions
between intra-linguistic features that are judged as being suitable for friend
use and those judged as being suitable for acquaintance use in the
statistical analysis, and reports of differential use for friends and
acquaintances in the discourse analysis.
H03 : There will be no evidence of a significant relationship between
intra-linguistic features and social distance, in either the statistical analysis
or the discourse analysis.
Hypothesis 4: I expect to see a statistically significant correlation between
number and politeness or ungrammaticality judgements for labels that
belong to the Type II (Jewish, Scottish) and Type III (Chinese) formal
lexical classes.
H04 : There will be no statistically significant correlation according to
formal lexical class and number.
6 Methodology
6.1 Methodological disputes
Stance research has been undertaken with a number of different approaches,
including sociolinguistic and linguistic anthropological fieldwork, corpus linguistics
methods, acceptability judgements. I will briefly discuss some of the strengths
and weaknesses of the methods used in the literature I have discussed in Sections
2–4 with a view to selecting a method for my own enquiry. As in Adachi’s review
of methodologies for speech act research (2011, pp. 49-58), it seems that “there
is no one perfect methodology out there” (2011, p. 54).
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6.1.1 Fieldwork methods
In the context of stance literature, “fieldwork methods” means
participant–observer data collection, which is recorded and later used for
conversation analysis, critical discourse analysis, or other type of linguistic
analysis. Fieldwork has the potential to yield large amounts of ethnographic
information which has the three major advantages.
Firstly, the researcher will be able to gain more insight into the interactional
context of conversation by knowing the participants better, and having a greater
knowledge of their community ties. This can help the researcher in interpreting
situated meaning. For example, Stuart-Smith opts for an explanation of stance in
liminoid situations to explain the data — it would have been impossible to arrive
at this explanation without knowledge of which situations could be considered
liminoid for a given speaker, which in turn requires detailed knowledge of the
speaker, and their social situation (Stuart-Smith 2010).
Secondly, fieldwork methods allow for the type of social network to be taken into
account in the analysis, since the structure of social networks may play a large
role in creating or maintaining certain types of meaning (Milroy & Milroy 2010).
Thirdly, fieldwork methods have traditionally been used in order to gain more
naturalistic data. It is worth noting, however, that there is an extensive body of
anthropological literature on researcher subjectivity and Otherness in the field,
and the extent to which this may affect the researcher’s inclusion in the field
community, or may bias the researcher with respect to the data (see, for example
Kulick & Wilson 1995). In other words, linguists may be overestimating the
extent to which participant–observation really allows them an understanding of
participants’ interactional context.
A methodological reliance on subjectivity may therefore make fieldwork data
vulnerable through not necessarily being repeatable or falsifiable, and this may
compromise its scientific status (see Popper 1998). Additionally, fieldwork is
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highly time– and energy–intensive.
6.1.2 Corpus methods
Corpus methods have the advantage of being able to draw on a much larger
range of genres and contexts than fieldwork methods, and being able to work
with larger data sets than could be collected using fieldwork or lab–based
methods. Typically this typically does not include naturally–occurring
face-to-face interactions, but does tend to include recorded or
computer–mediated interaction which may be suitable for conversational or
discursive analytic methods (see, for example Somasundaran and Wiebe). The
disadvantage is that it may be difficult to get ethnographic information about the
participants, so corpus methods tend to be most suitable for statistics–based
research, rather than ethnography–based work.
6.1.3 Acceptability judgements
Theoretical linguistics has tended to draw heavily on intuition for data about the
grammaticality or acceptability of particular sentences. Often this takes the form
of authors relying on their own intuitions, but may also include sampling the
intuitions of lay speakers with surveys, to gather data on acceptability
judgements. This may be done using a variety of methods, including various
forms of ordinal data such as 7-point scales, or continuous line scales.
The use of the authors’ own intuitions comes from the Chomskyan tradition that
one cannot be wrong about one’s own linguistic intuitions. However, as a
methodological principle, it is subject to what I shall refer to as the Headcocking
Problem — a term taken from Barbara C. Scholz’s work, who described the
problem as an individual who tilts their head and squints just so, and intuits a
judgement without further evidence (History of Analytic Philosophy Seminars
200/2010). Headcocked judgements may not be scientifically rigorous because of
the following problems:
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• they may involve unwarranted or implausible degrees of accommodation.
• they may involve making an unwarranted generalisation about a class of
features based on a single example, or a small number of examples.
• it is unclear whether grammaticality judgements should be made on the
basis of individual judgements or on the basis of speech community norms;6
some individuals may be exceptionally accommodating, and so may not
accurately reflect the community norms; additionally, some norms may only
come into play in certain social situations (Bell 2010) so an individual
working in isolation is not accurately recreating the conditions that trigger
particular forms or judgements.
Schütze discusses various difficulties with obtaining grammaticality judgements
from lay speakers (2010), and argues that lay speakers give acceptability
judgements, not grammaticality judgements in the way that linguists think about
“grammar”, since a sentence may be unacceptable to a lay speaker because of
semantic, pragmatic, or social factors. Additionally, lay speakers tolerate
sentences that linguists consider ungrammatical, and do not tolerate sentences
that linguists do consider to be grammatical. Schütze gives the following
example as a case that lay speakers seem to tolerate although most linguists
agree it is ungrammatical (from Schütze 2010, p. 213):
(6) More people have been to Russia than I have.
Lay speakers also do not necessarily show a strict demarcation between
acceptable and unacceptable sentences — they may judge some sentences as
“not great” or “not what I would say”, but not completely unacceptable. Finally,
Schütze notes that it may not always be clear who should be considered to be
speaking “the same language” in that some constructions may be acceptable
only to a small speech community.
6It has not gone unnoticed that speech community membership is not a straightforward
matter for the purpose of grammaticality judgements. See Schütze PAGE.
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The disadvantage of acceptability judgements, as Adachi points out, is that it
does not help when it comes to collecting data on the frequency and distribution
patterns of the production of the features that are being investigated (Adachi
2011, p. 50). There may also be a risk of Observer’s Paradox, as the tasks
designed to elicit acceptability judgements may be ones that make speakers
self-conscious or trigger high attention to speech.
However, there are advantages to this method. In particular, it allows for the
collection of speakers’ opinions and ideologies about particular forms in a highly
time–efficient manner. Because part of my focus is speaker opinions and
ideologies, I have used a combination of survey and discursive methods that focus
on acceptability judgements; the method is described in detail in Section 6.2.
6.1.4 The Observer’s Paradox and ethical issues
The Observer’s Paradox is the dilemma that arises when one considers that
people may behave differently if they know they are being observed, compared to
situations when they believe that they are unobserved. As linguists we usually
want to obtain data about speakers’ behaviour and beliefs in a context that is as
close to how they behave ordinarily; but to collect this data, we must observe
them, and in observing speakers, we may be changing their speech.
The Observer’s Paradox is of particular importance since it is usually considered
unacceptable or irresponsible to record people without their informed consent.
This being the case, many researchers have opted for research methods that
either minimise participants’ sense of being observed; for example, Stuart-Smith
and her colleagues set up various game scenarios for their study participants in
order to make their participants feel more comfortable (2010). Alternatively, a
researcher may opt to set up the study such that the Observer’s Paradox is
exploited in order to tap into the participants’ meta-linguistic knowledge and
ideologies, as in Bell’s work on audience design (2010). This latter is the
approach I have taken in the present research since it was important to collect
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not only self-reports of use, but also information about the ideologies that
constrain use.
In some cases, the situations that might give rise to the most naturalistic
realisations of a variable would put participants at unacceptable or irresponsible
levels of risk. For example, in my own research, there would have been a high
risk of causing significant psychological stress to participants had I attempted to
elicit naturalistic productions of utterances that could have been offensive,
hurtful, or threatening; so ethical considerations barred me from using such a
method; additionally, it is not clear that such a method would have succeeded in
eliciting the specific data I needed in sufficient quantity.
Some linguists have queried the extent to which observation actually does change
speech to a sufficient extent as to invalidate results obtained in non-naturalistic
settings (see Cameron 2011). That is not to deny audience–design effects (Bell
2010), but rather to suggest that it is the type of observation, not the
observation itself, that should be the focus of methodological concern. There is
some risk that my method might be perceived as a “formal” situation, which
might cause that participants may be more polite or formal in this context than
they would, say, if they were having an informal chat in the pub with close
friends. But I consider that this risk is worthwhile, as it also permits me to
gather extensive meta-linguistic information about language ideologies.
6.2 Method
In the present research I have taken an empirical approach to some of the
questions I raise in the earlier sections, which I will use to inform a theoretical
enquiry in Sections 11–13. The goal of the experimental enquiry is to know
whether speakers consistently associate certain lexicosyntactic constructions with
particular sociopolitical stances. There are two portions to my method: a pilot
study consisting of a focus group which yielded some fairly free–form
conversation; and a survey to gather statistical data. Both components are
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described in detail below.
Since constructions containing identity labels are the focus of extensive lay
speaker ideologies, I will be able to test for how consistently speakers associate
certain constructions with particular stances. Cameron & Kulick 2003 note that
such ideologies is often be associated with community building and
in-group/out-group usage (pp. 25-6; also Cameron 1985, p. 78; Zwicky 2003, p.
84). It will therefore be important to collect demographic information in order to
check for social factors which might constrain variation.
I intend to examine the effect of grammatical category of the identity label
(Hall-Lew & Norcliffe 2006, Zwicky 1997a), plurals and lexical class (Hall-Lew &
Norcliffe 2006, Tuite 1995), determiner presence and type (Kamp & Reyle 1993
Russell 1905, Strawson 1966, Webber 1979), and grammatical pattern in which
the label occurs.
6.3 Focus group
I used a focus group as a pilot study which served two purposes: firstly, it allowed
me to check the questions and parameters that should be used for the survey (to
ensure that all of the lexicosyntactic constructions that had compiled for use in
the survey were indeed within the envelope of variation); and secondly, the focus
group also allowed me to collect discourse data.
Focus group participants were recruited from the undergraduate population of
Edinburgh University. The participants were shown the sentence list in Appendix
I, which used the following lexical categories:
ethnicity/race: black, white
religion: Catholic, Protestant, Jew(ish)
nationality: Scot(tish), German, Chinese
sexuality: gay[masc], gay[gender−neutral], lesbian
subculture: emo
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Henceforth, I shall term the set of sentences I tested containing the lexical item
emo as the “emo cluster”, and so on, mutatis mutandum, for all of the others.
The participants were asked for their opinions on the sentences, what they
thought the sentences implied, whether any were offensive or polite, whether they
would use them for different audiences, and whether any were grammatically
incorrect. The conversation was loosely structured by my questions, but also by
the participants’ interests and what they felt was significant about the sentences.
Although designing the task in this way gave the participants a great deal of
meta–knowledge about the task, it seemed to me that meta–linguistic knowledge
was a strength in this case, as I was able to gain information about language
ideologies, as explained above.
Demographic data was also collected from the participants using a short
demographic questionnaire.
Three students participated in the focus group, and the conversation was sound–
and video–recorded. Because of the use of video–recording, two kinds of informed
consent procedure were used. Verbal consent was obtained prior to recording,
and the participants were given written consent forms at the end of the recording.
The focus group yielded 27 minutes of conversation which I then transcribed and
used for discourse analysis. This analysis is presented in Section 8.
Some changes were made to the sentence list that was then in preparation for
the survey, as a result of observations made in the focus group. The “The
people” constructions did not appear to be within the envelope of variation, so all
instances of person or people were changed to student(s), except in the German
cluster and the Chinese cluster, where I replaced student(s) with scientist(s) in
order to avoid the possibility of the sentence being understood as meaning
“student of German/Chinese” rather than “student who is German/Chinese”. In
order to maximise comparability across the lexical categories, two attributive
adjective patterns were added to the set of grammatical patterns. The vegetarian
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cluster was added so that there would be two clusters in the Subculture category;
and in order to reduce the risk of survey fatigue, the gay[gender−neutral] cluster
was removed. Finally, a question was added to the demographic questionnaire in
the survey asking participants about their political engagement.
6.4 Survey
An online survey was used to gather statistically analysable data on acceptability
judgements of the lexicosyntactic constructions.







Each cluster consisted of 10 syntactic patterns for each lexical cluster:
A) (indefinite-Det + singular-Nlabel)complement−NP
B) (Adjlabel)singular−complement−NP
C) (definite-Det + Adjlabel + singular-Nproper−name)subject−NP
D) (Adjlabel + singular-Nproper−name)subject−NP
E) (plural-Nlabel) subject−NP
F) (definite-Det + Adjlabel + plural-N)subject−NP
G) (definite-Det + plural-Nlabel)subject−NP
H) (Adjlabel + plural-N)subject−NP
I) (indefinite-Det+ Adjlabel + singular-N)complement−NP
J) (definite-Det + Adjlabel + singular-N + singular-Nproper−name) subject−NP
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And for each cluster, the following questions were asked:
1. Which sentence is the most polite?
2. Are any of these sentences offensive, and if so, which ones?
3. Can you imagine using any of these sentences to talk about a friend, and if
so, which ones?
4. Can you imagine using any of these sentences to talk about someone you
know only slightly, and if so, which ones?
5. Are any of the questions grammatically wrong, and if so, which ones?
The sentences, and the clusters, were presented in random order. However, the
questions were always presented in the same left–to–right order, with the
question about grammaticality to the furthest right, in order to avoid priming
participants about grammaticality judgements which might influence their views
on the acceptability of the sentences (following Johnstone & Kiesling 2008).
At the end of the survey, the participants were asked for demographic data:
gender, race/ethnicity, religious beliefs (if any), sexuality/sexual orientation, age,
where they are from, and whether they would describe themselves as politically
engaged.7 The participants were asked to enter this information into free text
boxes rather than selecting from a list, for all the demographic questions except
for age (which had to be a numeric value), and political engagement (the
participants selected “yes” or “no”, but could fill in free text for a “yes”
response). There was also an opportunity for participants to make general
comments about the sentences if they wished, towards the end of the survey.
7I use the terms ethnicity/race, sexuality/sexual orientation, and religion/religious beliefs as
being interchangeable for each case, although this is not standard sociolinguistic practice. This
is because, it is not clear that all lay speakers make consistent distinctions between, for example,
race and ethnicity (Saul 2006); and speakers who do consistently make such a distinction may
not make it along the same lines that linguists do.
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The survey was distributed to undergraduates of the university through
departmental mailing lists, as well as to politically-oriented student societies in
order to recruit participants who were engaged in politics, as wells as participants
who were not. The survey was also distributed through social media.8
This yielded 54 completed survey responses, with 120 acceptability judgements
per participant, for a total of 6480 judgements.
The responses were coded for the social and intra-linguistic factors mentioned
above. This way of coding does introduce some duplication: coding for
grammatical pattern and a range of grammatical features means that some
factor groups will not be independent of each other. However, I considered that
it was worth the risk, as coding for grammatical pattern tracks only effects
connected to each distinct syntactic construction, whereas coding for plurals and
determiner presence tracks for similarities between grammatical patterns.
Coding for lexical cluster and the participants’ demographic data constitutes
double coding of a slightly different sort. One way for social factors to affect
acceptability is for the lexical clusters to be judged differently because of their
subject matter (Schultz 1975 argues this might play an important role in semantic
derogation); but another way is for certain social groups to behave differently in
their acceptability judgements. I coded for both of these possibilities.
The data was analysed using Rbrul, and the results are presented in the next
section.
7 Results: Discourse Analysis
In this section, I shall examine 11 transcribed extracts from the focus group. The
focus group consisted of three undergraduates recruited from undergraduate
population of Edinburgh University. The given names used for the participants in
the transcripts are, of course, pseudonyms.
8Special thanks to the people who retweeted and shared the survey on Facebook and Twitter.
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In many ways, the three participants seem to be demographically typical
examples of the students who responded to the survey. Of the three participants,
two were male (James and Gareth), and one was female (Laura). James and
Gareth are Scottish, and Laura is English. Laura and James are both 20 years
old, and Gareth is a mature student. All three participants are white. Gareth is
religious and mentions attending church, but James is atheist and Laura has no
religion. Of the three, one described themselves as bisexual, one as heterosexual,
and one participant preferred not to say.
Overall, the discourse shows a great deal of latching and crosstalk, which is
typically thought to be a supportive interaction behaviour. The transcription
conventions are shown in Appendix II.
7.1 Lexicosyntactic features as vehicles for stance
7.1.1 Extract 1: “Depersonalising”
In this extract, Gareth and Laura are discussing sentence types C and D from the
focus group sentence list given in Appendix I (note that the set of gramamtical
patterns used in for the focus group does not correspond exactly to those used in
the survey, so C and D mentioned here are not the same C and D from the
survey!), for example, sentences such as The Catholic, Edith, celebrates
Christmas.
((T=1:51))
=if I was wanting to say C or D, I would say “Edith is aGareth:31
Catholic, and she celebrates Christmas”=32
=Mm.=Int:33
And I wouldn’t, I wouldn’t conflate Catholic and Edith.Gareth:34
((A few turns skipped))
The use of say “THE Catholic” or “THE emo”, orLaura:41
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“THE lesbian”, it sounds like you’re just picking out42
that quality of them?=43
Right.=Gareth:44
=And that’s all that’s importantLaura:45
All that’s important, yes.Gareth:46
((A few turns skipped))
Yeah.Laura:57
And particularly the use of a demonstrative, sounds like58
that’s just how you would talk about them, like you- it’s59
almost like you’re using that instead of a name, even60
though you’re using a name as well.61
Mm.Int:62
It’s like, I wouldn’t want anyone to refer to me likeLaura:63
“THE something”.64
It It sounds a little bit like a, I don’t know.65
It sounds slightly offensive, unless it was “THE66
something really good”, but if it was just “THE some67
quality of me”, it’s a bit, deper- like depersonalising.68
((T = 3:17))
In this extract, Laura and Gareth discuss the problems of isolating a single quality
and “conflat[ing]” them with the person (line 34). Laura isolates elements of
lexicosyntactic structure as contributing to an “offensive” (line 66) stance:
“particularly the use of a demonstrative” in line 58. Laura goes on to say that it
is the “depersonalising” aspect (line 68) of this construction that is offensive.
Here Laura particularly isolates the definite determiner, which she repeatedly
stresses in lines 41–42 and 64–67.
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7.1.2 Extract 2: “[T]he connotations of calling someone emo”
((T= 11:02))
I think, also, like, oddly, like, it’s um 4B, the LACK ofLaura:259
demonstrative makes it sound a little bit more offensive260
again? Like, rather than the other way round.261
To say “something is emo” is a little more offensive than262
to say “someone is an emo”.263
Hmm.Int:264
Ok.265
I’m not sure WHY.Laura:266
Like it’s the only one I think out of the entire group that267
I would say it was that way round.268
Right.Int:269
I think.Laura:270
Having read through them.271
Cause like I said that like “is a gay” sounds more272
offensive than “is gay”.273
And I’d say the same for most of them. But for some274
reason, to say someone is emo? is more offensive.275
I think possibly just because of the connotations of276
calling someone emo.277
Like sometimes you don’t mean they’re of that278
subculture.279
Sometimes you just mean that they’re just WHIning a280
bit and they need to shut up. So to say that someone is281
an emo can’t have that connotation, [but to say]282
[You- you mean] why emo can be used as an insult.James:283
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Yeah, right.Laura:284
I think that’s different.James:285
Every single one of them can be used [as]Gareth:286
[Ah YEAH], but emo more so I think, because I wouldn’tJames:287
just go “oh you’re Chinese”, it would just be “and?”288
Yeah, if someone if someone called me like Chinese itLaura:289
wouldn’t offend me at all.290
If someone called me emo I would actually be a little be291
upset, @so.292
((T = 12:05))
Here again, Laura isolates an element of lexicosyntactic structure — this time
the “LACK of demonstrative” (line 259) — that makes a construction offensive,
rather than the presence of a demonstrative, which is the element discussed in
Extract 1.
Laura remark that “if someone called me Chinese it wouldn’t offend me at all”
(line 290), together with James’s hypothetical negotiation of “I wouldn’t just go
“oh you’re Chinese, it would just be “and?”” (lines 287–288) suggests that some
lexical items are more affect–laden than others: there is something specific to the
lexical significance of emo. This is good grounds to think that the lexical clusters
may behave differently with regard to acceptability judgements, and also with
regard to how affect–laden they can be.
7.1.3 Extract 3: “I was just taught not to”
((T = 3:29))
I don’t like “Harry is a Chinese”.Gareth:69
Yeah. I think with [all the] nationality ones, I’m thinking.James:70
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[That’s].Gareth:71
Well I don’t I don’t MIND it with “a German”, “a Jew”,72
“a Catholic”, “a lesbian”, “a Scot”.73
I’m a Scot and I don’t mind myself being referred to74
that way.75
I don’t like “a black”.76
Mm.Int:77
Or “a gay” as well.James:78
YEAH.Laura:79
Yes, “a gay”. Same thing.Gareth:80
“A white” likewise.81
But seem- seems fine with um, with “a German” or “a82
Catholic”.=83
=Mm.Int:84
I think there’s something specific about “Chinese”.Gareth:85
You don’t - (Hx), I don’t know? I was just taught not86
to, as a child?87
But it it seems worse with Chinese, FAR worse with88
Chinese than with German.=89
((T = 4:28))
Here Gareth notes that nationality words do not necessarily pattern together in
terms of their acceptability for the “x is a [label ] ” construction: “I’d happily say
that “so-and-so is a German”, but never DREAM of saying “Harry is a
Chinese””, in lines (91–92), and compares “a Chinese” with “a gay”, “a white”,
and “a black” (lines 76, 80, 81), but isolates “a Chinese” as having “something
specific about” it (line 85).
This seems noteworthy in that Chinese is a sibilant-ending ethnonym which
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belongs to Type III in Tuite’s typology (1995), and Hall-Lew and Norcliffe’s
results would lead us to expect that using it in a singular construction would be
considered ungrammatical (2006). But here the participants seem to regard it as
comparable, but “FAR worse”, than Type I ethnonyms such as Germans. This is
good grounds to think that ungrammaticality and offensiveness may be proxies
for each other in terms of how ordinary speakers perceive acceptability (cf
Schütze 2010, Hall-Lew & Norcliffe 2006).
7.2 Plurals and grammaticality
7.2.1 Extract 4: “[N]atural plurals”
((T = 15:53))




I wouldn’t use “Chinese” as a plural count noun.Gareth:362
Mm, no I would- I would say 3E, actually. I thinkJames:363
“Chinese celebrate Chinese New Year” that, that’s fine364
for me.365
That’s ok for you, is it?Gareth:366
YeahJames:367
Aha.Gareth:368
I I w- wouldn’t say that.Laura:369
I would say “the Chinese” [or] “Chi- Chinese [PEople]”,370
but I wouldn’t just say “Chinese celebrate”.371
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[Yeah] [Yes]Gareth:372
For some reason, I don’t know why.Laura:373
Like grammatically it just doesn’t sit right.374
It’s um, you can say “Scots”, you can say “Germans”,Gareth:375
the words “Scot” and “German” used as nouns have376
natural plurals.377
Yeah.Laura:378
You can’t say “Chineses”.Gareth:379
Um, and I think it’s the difficulty of making the word380
“Chinese” plural.381
I find even “Harry is a Chinese” a BIT off, to be honest.Laura:382
Yes.Gareth:383
Mm. That does seem a bit off.James:384
((T = 16:55))
Here the participants isolate acceptability problems for Chinese depending on
plurality. The singular and plural of Chinese are formally identical (Tuite 1995),
but as the participants note, there may be constraints on usage for bare plurals.
James finds the bare plural construction, Chinese celebrate Chinese New Year,
acceptable (line 363), but Laura does not (lines 369–371) and she offers “the
Chinese” or “Chinese people” as better alternatives, noting that “grammatically
it just doesn’t sit right” (line 374).
Conversely, for the singular, all three speakers seem to regard “Harry is a
Chinese” — that is, the Type a singular nominal construction with an indefinite
determiner — as being “a BIT off” (line 382). As in the previous extract, this is
a construction that, according to Hall-Lew and Norcliffe’s results, one would
expect to be considered ungrammatical (2006); but the interviewer question
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about grammaticality has been renegotiated to “off” in line 382 by Laura, so this
is good grounds to think that there is a connection between ungrammaticality
and offensiveness.
Gareth attributes these effects to the lack of a “natural plural” for Chinese (lines
377, 379–381), which he exemplifies with the impossibility of inflecting for
number in line 379. Gareth is in fact incorrect about whether the word Chinese
can be plural, — since Hall-Lew and Norcliffe’s findings would seem to indicate
that it is compulsory for Chinese to occur in plural constructions (2006). But
Gareth is right to note that plurality may be relevant for Chinese which is a Type
III ethnonym.
7.2.2 Extract 5: “You could use it to [identify him]”
((T = 21:16))
You could use it to [identify him,]Gareth:485
[Mhm. Yeah]Laura:486
if there were two Toms, you could say “no no, I’mGareth:487
talking about blind Tom”.=488
=[Yeah.]James:489
=[Yeah] and like you could do the same possibly withLaura:490
like black and white. Like if you have two friends called491
Tom you could say “oh yeah, black Tom”.492
Yeah.Gareth:493
But that would be with company that you knew quiteLaura:494
well.495
[Yeah it’s a bit of an insult]James:496
[You you wouldn’t use] that as the feature with peopleLaura:497
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you don’t know498
((T = 21:34))
Here the participants discuss under what circumstances it is appropriate to use
constructions such as Black Georgina celebrates Hogmanay, and line 485 Gareth
suggests that it could be used to “identify” a person, and then he and Laura
repeat that this would be “if there were two Toms” (line 487) and “if you have
two friends called Tom (line 491–492). Even used in the context they suggest,
James, says that it is “a bit of an insult” (line 496) and so Laura emphasises that
it would be for use with “company that you knew quite well” (lines 494 – 495),
not “with people you don’t know” (lines 497–498).
The picture we get here is that this construction is only suitable as contrastive
(to “identify”, line 485), when it is implicit in the context that there are multiple
possibilities for the referent of the named individual.
7.3 Social kind construction and related language norms
The participants do seem to show a general preference for more economical
options, as shown in this extract:
7.3.1 Extract 6: “Tautologous”
((T = 5:37))
I think 6B is a bit odd, saying “Charlotte is a lesbianLaura:118
WOman”.119
Yeah, it’sJames:120
Because, I think that’s possiblyLaura:121
Yeah [what’s the purpose]James:122
[just superfluous]=Laura:123
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=not necessary, it’s tauto- tautologous=Gareth:124
=Yeah, the same with “THE lesbian women celebrateJames:125
Pride”.126
And I think if you were adding that extra thing in, itLaura:127
almost sounds like you w- wouldn’t understand a128
hundred percent what lesbian meant?129
((a few turns skipped))
It’s as if that- the person who’s saying “The JewishLaura:138
people” feels like they need to specify that Jewish people139
ARE people?140
((T = 6:43))
In this extract, the participants criticise lexicosyntactic constructions that they
consider to be “superfluous” or “tautologous” (lines 123–124), in that they
duplicate information that seems to already be lexically encoded (“if you were
adding that extra thing in”, line 127). Moreover, if one does specify unnecessary
information, this marks the speaker as either not understanding (“almost sounds
like you w- wouldn’t understand a hundred percent”, lines 128–129) the meaning
of the label lesbian or Jewish, or as taking a particular stance relative to
Jewishness (“It’s as if the person who’s saying “The Jewish people” feels like
they need to specify that Jewish people ARE people?”, line 140).
Curiously, Laura herself uses the construction “Jewish people” that she seems to
be criticising in line 140.
7.3.2 Extract 7: “[Y]ou don’t use that as the distinguishing feature”
((T = 21:34))
[You you wouldn’t use] that as the feature with peopleLaura:494
you don’t know, and I think that co- that’s VERY495
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obvious, like when people, like uh when you’re you’re496
watching TV like when there’s an audience? and they’re497
trying to pick people out they specifically don’t say like498
“the BLACK man”. “Can I have a question from THE499
BLACK man?”500
=Or they’ll like point out by your T-shirt or something.James:501
Yeah it’s like “the person with the white shirt.”Laura:502
There could be like THREE people with white shirts in503
that area and they’re all like “which one of us?” but504
they’re still not going to say505
=Yeah it’ll be more your hair, stuff like thatJames:506
Yeah. Cause anything, any other feature, you don’t useLaura:507
that as the distinguishing feature.508
((T = 22:08))
Despite the participants’ apparent preference for less “superfluous” constructions,
expressed in Extract 6, this extract suggests that in some cases, circumlocution is
preferable (line 498), to avoid using race as “the distinguishing feature”.
7.3.3 Extract 8: “[H]as [...] connotations of race
Some of the lexical clusters are ambiguous with respect to social type: for
example, it is unclear whether Jew(ish) is considered to be a race term or a
religion term. In this extract, Laura and Gareth suggest that Jew is a race term,
but Jewish is a religion term:
((T = 24:20))
If if I were, if I were to convert to Judaism, I would sayGareth:563
“I’m now Jewish”, but I wouldn’t regard myself as one564
of the Jewish people.565
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Because– sorry why is that?Int:566
Because the phrase “the Jewish people” has for meGareth:567
connotations of race.568
Oh right I [see, ok.]Int:569
[I see.]James:570
[Yeah]Laura:571
I’ve converted, I’m not one of THEM, I’ve merelyGareth:572
converted to their religion, is the way that I would see it.573
And you also wouldn’t say like “I’m a Jew”, no, I don’tLaura:574
think.575
I don’t think I would.576
No, “I’m Jewish” #James:577




=Because it sounds like, just doesn’t sound likeLaura:582
something you could suddenly become.583
It would just be like walking in and going “I’m black584
now” and like I can’t do that, it’s not going to happen,585
so.586
((T = 25:04))
Here race is presented as immutable by Laura: “I can’t do that, it’s not going to
happen”, lines 580–581; and “just doesn’t sound like something you could
suddenly become” lines 582–583. By contrast, religion is presented as something
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one can convert to (lines 563, 572). On Laura and Gareth’s account, the
race/religion distinction between Jew and Jewish is such that a Jewish person
and Jew(s) could potentially have different referents, in the hypothetical case of
someone who converts to Judaism (lines 563–564 and 575). Gareth explains
that, were he to convert, this would make him Jewish, but not “one of the
Jewish people” (lines 564–565) which Laura renegotiates to “a Jew” when she
says that if she would not say “I’m a Jew” if she had converted, in lines 574 and
repeats in line 578.
7.4 Double-barrelling
7.4.1 Extract 9: “Could just be describing”
((T = 4:45))
“is a GAY” sounds particularly offensive to me.Laura:98
I think possibly because, when people have said that99
around me like at, high school and stuff, they’ve100
MEANT it in an offensive way?101
[Yeah.]James:102
[Right]Int:103
So, like, to say like someone is gay, like it CAN beLaura:104
offensive but it- you could also just be describing.105
But to say someone is A gay, was almost always used106
offensively.107
((T=5:08))
Here Laura highlights the tension between the derogatory baggage (““a gay”
sounds particularly offensive to me”, line 98) and referential sense (“you could
also just be describing”, line 105) of gay. So it seems reasonable to consider gay
to be a semantically “double-barreled” term (Zwicky 2003, p. 84): there is an
affective component and a referential component and both are lexically encoded.
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In Extract 2 above, double-barrelling also seems to be an important attribute of
emo, in Laura’s remark that if you call someone an emo, “ sometimes you don’t
mean they’re of that subculture. Sometimes you just mean that they’re just
whining a bit and they need to shut up” (lines 279–281). Laura also notes that
some of the labels have more affective content than others, in that being called
an emo is more offensive than being called, say, Chinese (lines 289–292).
Similarly, in the next extract Laura discusses her reservations about lesbian.
7.4.2 Extract 10: “there’s always that sort of FEEling”
((T = 15:16))
I would say maybe “you’re a lesbian” but I don’t think ILaura:348
would say “you’re a gay”.349
It just- even saying it just now out loud it feels a bit like350
I’m doing something I shouldn’t.351
Cause I COULD be causing offense to someone.352
But I think there is that like - there is just that whole353
thing where people like use “gay” to mean something354
REAlly negative for a LONG long time, so I think there’s355
always that sort of FEEling when you use the word.356
((T = 15:43))
Here Laura remarks that lesbian and gay may always have a negative dimension
to them (line 355), to the point that Laura reports concern about saying lesbian
in the focus group setting (line 350). This suggests that, while the extent to
which a term is offensive may vary in context, it may be that some semantically
double-barrelled terms cannot ever be only referential and not affective.
7.4.3 Extract 11: “Jokingly insulting”
((T = 14:11))
Yeah, if I was joke- jokingly insulting someone, a friend, ILaura:326
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would definitely go with the A categories, on these like,327
1A “Edith is a Catholic” sort of a thing like.328
To say someone is “a something” is- is for some reason329
a little bit more insulting330
So I would use those with friends, but I wouldn’t use331
those with people I didn’t know well.332
And when I was using them with friends I would333
probably be using them with the intention of being334
jokingly insulting.335
Mm.Int:336
Although I don’t think I would even say “you’re a gay”Laura:337
to one of my friends, particularly one who WAS actually338
gay.=339
=Yeah. Although I I w- would say, I think me and myJames:340
sister say that, to each other a lot, in jest. But if anyone341
who’s actually gay, you’d NEver say that to them.342
((T = 14:55))
Here the “you’re a gay” construction seems to have a default insulting reading,
but proximity might mitigate the insult and make it “jest” (line 341). However,
Laura and James both seem to suggest that the strategy is not available if the
addressee is “actually gay” (lines 339 and 341).9
A reasonable query is who is “actually gay”, since in the discourse analytic
method, this should not be a-priori’ed. Cameron 1997 paper on men’s
9Caroline Heycock notes that this could be a social/pragmatic constraint associated with the
paucity of situations in which one would non-insultingly inform another person of their sexuality
or other demographic group membership. While this is a possibility, it does not seem a flaw
to the argument, since You’re a gay seems to be available for jokingly insulting someone in a
way that You’re a jazz enthusiast or You’re a young professional does not. This would seem to
indicate that the double-barrelled property of gay is not solely due to the context of informing
someone else of their demographic membership. A tip of the hat to Caroline for helpful discussion
on this point.
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homosocial gossip explores the connection between the disparaging sense and
normative masculinity. In the extract she analyses, a group of young men
describe a classmate as “that really gay guy” (p. 67) which is re-negotiated to
“he’s the antithesis of man”. In another extract, “a real artsy, fartsy fag he’s like
(indeciph) he’s so gay” sits next to a woman classmate, who is described as
having “four homos hitting on her” (p. 69). Cameron points out (p. 66) that the
criteria for the categorisation of people as “gay” or “homo” in the discourse is
not necessarily straightforwards, since what we know about the romantic life of
the supposed “homos” is that they “hit[ ] on” women, so it seems clear that
“homo” in this case does not mean something like “someone whose sociopolitical
identity is typically associated with experiencing attraction to people of the same
gender”, but rather something like “non-normatively masculine”, since the
interlocutors express other disapproval of the men in question by criticising their
clothing, their presumed behaviours, their bodies, and the “ugliest-ass bitch”
they are “hitting on” (p. 69).
Similarly, Zwicky 2003 seems to suggest that “faggot” means something like
[+gay man, +disparaging] or [+gay man, -normatively masculine], although the
disparaging dimension is not independent of the non-normatively masculinity
dimension. However, the use of normative masculinity is not the only way in
which gay can be disparaging. Another sense of gay is something like
“inadequate” or “wrongheaded”, not necessarily with any reference to
masculinity. For example, the following sentences would be well-understood
among my peers:
(7) East Enders is gay — the plots are so boring; I much prefer Doctor Who.
This suggests a process of semantic derogation (Schulz 1975, Wong 2002): a
process in which words become associated with people of lower social status and
for that reason become derogatory. Schulz argues this with words that become
associated with women in order to explain, for example, why words which ought
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to be masculine and feminine counterparts, such as master and mistress have
differ in their affective content (1975). Similarly, Wong argues that tongzhi has
undergone a process of semantic derogation due to its use for and by Chinese
lesbian and gay people (2002). It seems reasonable to posit that the English gay
has undergone a similar process due to its association with homosexuality. This
semantic derogation licenses its use as an insult.10
However, Laura and James note some tension between the insulting use and the
“literal” use: “I don’t think I would even say “you’re a gay” to one of my friends,
particularly one who WAS actually gay” (lines 337-337, and 342). The
disparaging sense is invoked specifically in contrast to “actually gay” (lines 338
and 342). So the implication is that the disparaging sense is not the “actual”
sense of gay.
Semantic derogation also explains why political instability might lead to linguistic
instability: if a linguistic form becomes derogatory through association with a
particular demographic group, the group may then seek a new linguistic form
(although one would want to avoid a strongly Whorfian view of semantic change
as being driven entirely by societal structure).
8 Results: Quantitative Analysis
In this section I will present the statistical analysis for each of the dependent
variables in turn. Overall, the intralinguistic factor groups show some fairly
consistent patterns although the social factor groups are more of a mixed bag.
These trends will also be considered in more depth in the discussion in Section 9.
Throughout, percentages are accurate to one decimal place, and probabilities and
10Ronnie Cann notes that the referential component and affective component could be
homonyms, especially in a case like gay, where the affective component may appear in con-
texts where is seems to be bleached of its referential sense. While this is a possibility, it does
not seem fatal to my argument since the affective form can occur with the referential form. It
therefore seems more economical to explain this apparent–homonymy by pointing to semantic
processes like reclamation and semantic derogation. Thanks to Ronnie for helpful discussion on
this topic.
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factor weights are accurate to three significant figures unless otherwise specified.
I take the significance threshold to be p ≤ 0.05.
8.1 A note on the sample and coding
Since participants self-selected to take part, it is important to note the
demographics of the participants, and explain some of the coding and statistical
decision that were made. Although Rbrul will run an analysis on singleton groups
— a factor which consists of only one token or participant — it is generally
considered better practice to remove or recode singleton factors as they cannot
show evidence of variation according to that factor.
Because of this, some tokens had to be excluded from the statistical analysis.
From the place factor group, participants from Switzerland, Australia, India,
Trinidad and Tobago, or participants who had moved to the UK from other
countries, and one participant who gave their place information as “earth”, were
all excluded; as these participants all resulted in singleton groups, and some of
them constituted singleton groups in more than one factor group. From the
political engagement factor group, I excluded a participant who described
themself as independent, as this participant resulted in a singleton group. I also
excluded a participant who described themself as a Liberal activist, as I could not
be certain whether the participant was referring to the Liberal party (in which
case they would have formed a singleton group), or a “small-L liberal”, in which
case they could have been recoded. However, I still discuss all these participants’
responses as important data points for the discursive construction of the
demographic categories, as described in Section 9, so their survey data was still
highly valuable.
After excluding these participants from the statistical analysis, there remained a
total of 5160 tokens from 43 participants, for use in the statistical analysis. The
tables in this section give the demographic breakdown of the participants whose
tokens were used in the statistical analysis, after recoding.
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Gender
Of these 43 participants, 20 described themselves as female, one described herself
as a woman, 21 described themselves as male, and one was genderqueer (as we
shall see, gender turned out not to be significant, even after recoding attempted
recoding, so I have left the singleton groups as is).
Gender Number of Participants
Female or F 20
Woman 1
Genderqueer 1
Male or M 21
Total 43
Table 2: Survey participants by gender
Sexuality/Sexual orientation
In terms of sexuality 28 of the 43 participants (65.1%) identified as straight or
heterosexual, which is disproportionately low (one participant identified as
“straight/het” and was recoded as straight as that was the best fit statistically);
two participants answered “in a hetero-relationship currently” or answered “I
don’t” and were coded as “no label”. One participant answered “other” and was
coded with the queer participant as this was the best fit. The full breakdown by
sexuality is shown in Table 3.
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Table 3: Survey participants by sexuality
Age
Participants ranged in age from 17 to 64, but the sample is disproportionately
biased towards younger adults. The median age was 25.5; and only 8 participants
(18.6%) are over 40, compared to the 69.8% who are aged under 30. It is fair to
say, therefore, that this is primarily a survey of young adults’ judgements.
Place
Of the 43 participants, 34 of the participants (79.1%) were from the UK. Of
these 34 participants, 19 were English, 10 were Scottish, and 4 did not specify.
One participant from Northern Ireland was coded with the UK group as they
would otherwise have been a singleton group, although I realise this is politically
controversial. The full breakdown is given in Table 4. Prospective participants
were asked to take part only if they were native speakers of English.
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UK (not specified) 5
Total 43
Table 4: Survey participants by place
Ethnicity/race
Due to the high number of singleton groups, it would have been impossible to
include the ethnicity/race factor group without significant recoding. However,
while it would have been possible to recode some of the white denominations
together, it is unclear how to recode, for example, singleton factors like “Chinese”
and “British Sudanese”. Consequently, it was not possible to include to include
ethnicity in the statistical analysis. However, I rely on the ethnicity/race data the
participants gave as important data points for the discursive construction of the
demographic categories, and there is a fuller discussion of this in Section 9.5.7.
Religion
In answer to the question “How would you describe your religion, if any?”, nearly
half (48.8%) replied that they had none. Another 20.9% said they were atheist
and 9.3% said they were agnostic. Jointly these three groups constitute 79.1% of
the participants, so it is fair to say that they are not, on the whole, a religious
bunch. Three of the participants are Catholic, but of these two described
themselves as “lapsed” or “not religious”. Four participants were Protestant;
some described themselves simply as “Protestant”, but others gave a
denomination, and these included Episcopalian and Church of England. Two
participants were Jewish. One participant described themself as Quaker agnostic,
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but as they formed a singleton group, they were recoded as agnostic.








Table 5: Participants by religion
Political affiliation
Participants who did not describe themselves as being politically engaged were a
slight majority at 53.5%, compared to the 46.5% of participants who did describe
themselves as engaged. Participants who were politically engaged were
disproportionately likely to describe their engagement in terms of alignment with
socially progressive or left–of–center political parties (eg, the Green Party) or
ideologies (eg, socialist, “small-L liberal”); or with causes that are often
associated with social progressivism (eg, feminism, anti-militarism). Singleton
categories that patterned together statistically were coded together as “broad
left”; and a few participants detailed the type of engagement without a
description of their political alignment, such as saying they “watch the news and
debate with friends”, for example, and these participants were recoded together
with participants who described themselves as engaged but did not specify the
type of engagement.
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Engaged (not otherwise specified) 4
Total 43
Table 6: Participants by political engagement
8.2 Dependent variable: most polite
Politeness was measured by asking the participants “Which sentence is the most
polite?”. The significant factor groups for politeness were: grammatical pattern,
friend use, acquaintance use, offensiveness, ungrammaticality, place, religion,
sexuality, and political engagement. These are shown in the Table 7. Overall, the
probability for this model was p = 0.015.
As one would expect, offensiveness and ungrammaticality both disfavour a
politeness judgement, with offensive and ungrammatical sentences being judged
polite only 1.9% and 2.4% of the time, respectively, which is near–categorical.
Friend use and acquaintance use favour a politeness judgement and show a
virtually identical pattern: since sentences judged appropriate for friend use are
judged polite 33.5% of the time, and sentences judged appropriate for
acquaintance use are judged polite 32.2% of the time, which is perhaps slightly
lower than one might expect, although sentences judged not appropriate for
friend use or acquaintance use are near–categorically not judged polite.
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Of all the grammatical patterns, B ((Adjlabel)singular−complement−NP ), is the most
commonly judged as polite at 50.2%, and having a strongly favouring factor
weight11 of 0.907. The most strongly disfavoured patterns are patterns G, E, C,
and D:
G) (definite-Det + plural-Nlabel)subject−NP
E) (plural-Nlabel) subject−NP
C) (definite-Det + Adjlabel + singular-Nproper−name)subject−NP
D) (Adjlabel + singular-Nproper−name)subject−NP
All four of these constructions are considered to be polite in less than 3% of
cases and can all therefore be considered to be near–categorical non–polite
constructions.
English participants (14.6%, factor weight = 0.680) were more likely to judge the
sentences polite than Scottish participants (9.0%, factor weight = 0.299), who
produced the least politeness judgements overall (although participants from the
USA had the lowest factor weight at 0.241). Canadian participants were the
most likely to judge a sentence as polite, with a favouring factor weight of 0.757.
The top age bracket patterns more closely to the youngest participants than to
participants who are chronologically closer to them — in fact, the 17–22 group
and the 54+ group differ by only 0.6 percentage points. It is unclear how this
should be interpreted, since the correlation between decreased politeness
judgements and age is weak (R2 = 0.03736). It could be that the speakers in the
two higher age brackets, which have fewer participants, are anomalous.
Atheist participants have the highest factor weight of 0.618, closely followed by
participants who have no religion with 0.616, and agnostic participants are
slightly lower at 0.589. However, there are several crossovers in this group, so
11A factor weight, which is an probability scale between 0 and 1, is a measure of whether a
factor favours or disfavours a particular feature. A factor weight of 0 disfavours the feature, 1
favours it, and 0.5 is neutral.
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Figure 1: Showing politeness judgements by age
looking at the percentages, atheist participants pattern most closely with
Catholic participants, who produced the most politeness judgements at 15.3%.
Protestant participants produced the lowest number of politeness responses with
only 9.6%, but disfavour the politeness rating, rather than patterning with
agnostic participants who differed by only 0.2 percentage points.
The sexuality category is also something of a mixed bag with several crossovers.
Participants in the queer/other group most favour politeness responses, with a
strongly favouring factor weight of 0.933, but judged only 8.8% of the sentences
polite. The most politeness judgements are given by heterosexual participants, at
16.2%, which is slightly favouring. Curiously, participants who identified
themselves as straight do not pattern together with participants who identified
themselves as heterosexual; the former return only 11.8% politeness judgements.
Gay participants return the least politeness judgments, judging sentences as polite
in only 7.3% of cases, and showing a slightly disfavouring factor weight of 0.413.
Political engagement also shows some crossovers, with Labour Party members
producing the greatest percentage politeness responses with 19.2%, but
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Figure 2: Showing politeness judgements by age
Democrats are the most favouring according to factor weight, with the strongly
favouring factor weight of 0.841 (but the second–lowest percentage, with 9.2%).
The lowest percentage is produced by the broad left group with 7.7%.
Factor group Factor Tokens Percentage Factor
weight
Offensive 0 4169 15.0 0.653
(p = 1.83× 10−7) yes 991 1.9 0.347
Friend use yes 1279 33.5 0.546
(p = 0.0222) 0 3881 5.6 0.454
Acquaintance use yes 1362 32.2 0.671
(p = 2× 10−19) 0 3798 5.5 0.329
Ungrammatical 0 4748 13.4 0.639
(p = 0.000429) yes 412 2.4 0.361
Grammatical B 516 50.2 0.907
pattern A 516 21.5 0.790
(p = 1.96× 10−79)
I 516 21.7 0.711
F 516 11.0 0.588
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Factor group Factor Tokens Percentage Factor
weight
H 516 7.0 0.475
J 516 6.4 0.468
G 516 2.9 0.309
E 516 2.1 0.256
C 516 1.4 0.229
D 516 1.0 0.175
Place Canada 360 16.9 0.757
(p = 5.20× 10−21)
England 2280 14.6 0.680
UK (nos)12 600 12.7 0.526
Scotland 1200 9.0 0.299
USA 720 9.6 0.241
Age 29–40 840 17.3 0.715
(p = 7.98× 10−11)
23–28 1680 14.3 0.575
17–22 1680 10.2 0.544
54+ 240 10.8 0.463
41–53 720 8.9 0.223
Religion Atheist 1080 14.6 0.618
(p = 0.0419)
None 2520 12.4 0.616
Agnostic 480 9.8 0.589
Catholic 360 15.3 0.485
Protestant 480 9.6 0.372
Jewish 240 11.2 0.324
Sexuality Other/Queer 240 8.8 0.933
(p = 5.4× 10−17)
Lesbian 240 10.4 0.682
Heterosexual 1680 16.2 0.593
(No label) 240 14.6 0.516
Gay 480 7.3 0.413
Straight 1680 11.8 0.398
Bisexual 240 10.4 0.185
Asexual 360 9.2 0.169
Political Democrat 360 9.2 0.841
engagement Green 240 13.3 0.626
(p = 8.1× 10−14)
Labour 240 19.2 0.588
Small-L liberal 480 10.2 0.559
None 2760 14.3 0.555
Broad left 480 7.7 0.525
Engaged (nos) 360 8.3 0.213
12Here and throughout, “nos” stands for “not otherwise specified”.
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Factor group Factor Tokens Percentage Factor
weight
Socialist 240 10.0 0.143
Overall
Deviance Degrees Probability R2
of freedom
2475.837 41 0.015 0.453
Table 7 Factors constraining variation in politeness judge-
ments, in reply to the question “Which sentence is the most
polite?”
8.3 Dependent variable: offensiveness
Participants were asked for offensiveness judgements with the question “Are any
of these sentences offensive, and if so, which ones?”, and the factors constraining
variation are shown in Table 8. The significant factor groups constraining their
answers were: grammatical pattern, politeness, friend use, acquaintance use,
place, age, religion, sexuality, and political engagement. The overall probability
for the model is p = 0.036. Surprisingly, ungrammaticality is not significant for
offensiveness (p = 0.278), although it is significant for politeness, friend use, and
acquaintance use.
As one might expect, a politeness judgement, friend use judgement, and
acquaintance use judgement all disfavour an offensiveness judgement. Only 2.9%
of sentences judged polite, 2.0% of sentences reported for friend use, and 2.3%
of sentences reported for acquaintance use, are judged as offensive (factor
weights of 0.328, 0.287, and 0.334, respectively). These are all near–categorical.
However for sentences not judged polite, a surprisingly low percentage of only
21.5% are judged as offensive (factor weight = 0.672), which suggests that
participants are making a distinction between a sentence that is non-polite and
one that is offensive. Similarly, only 24.9% of sentences that are not judged as
friend use, and 25.3% of sentences that are not judged as acquaintance use, are
judged as offensive. It may be the case that participants distinguish between
what is offensive and what they simply would not use.
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Figure 3: Showing friend use and acquaintance use judgments by grammatical
pattern
Grammatical pattern A ((indefinite-Det + singular-Nlabel)complement−NP ) most
strongly favours an offensive response, with a factor weight of 0.756. But if
ranked by percentages, the four patterns that all return more than 30% are the
same four patterns that were least favoured in the politeness analysis, but in
different order:
G) (definite-Det + plural-Nlabel)subject−NP
D) (Adjlabel + singular-Nproper−name)subject−NP
E) (plural-Nlabel) subject−NP
C) (definite-Det + Adjlabel + singular-Nproper−name)subject−NP
Grammatical pattern B ((Adjlabel)singular−complement−NP ), which was the most
favoured in the politeness analysis, is the penultimate one here, with the
near–categorical 3.3% and a factor weight of 0.228. The most strongly
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Figure 4: Showing friend use and acquaintance use judgments by grammatical
pattern
disfavoured, and least selected pattern, is pattern I ((indefinite-Det+ Adjlabel +
singular-N)complement−NP ).
English participants and Scottish participants returned very similar responses,
with 18.1% and 18.5% offensive judgements respectively; but despite the
difference of only 0.4 percentage points, Scottish participants returned the most
disfavouring factor weight. Participants from the USA gave the most
offensiveness judgements, judging 27.1% of the sentences to be offensive (factor
weight = 0.825).
The results by age show a U–shaped curve with participants in the 41–54 group
giving the fewest offensiveness judgements (3.5%); and participants in the
youngest group judging 23.9% of the sentences offensive, and participants in the
54+ group returning the most offensiveness judgements at 50.8%. There is an
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overall trend of offensiveness judgements increasing with age, but the correlation
is weak (R2 = 0.1143). However, the 54+ group has only two participants, so it
could be an anomalous point in a trend of decreasing offensive judgements as age
increases.
The results by religion present a similar picture to the politeness results by
religion; and again, there are some crossovers. Catholic participants most
strongly favoured offensive judgements with a factor weight of 0.935, but judge
only 17.8% of the sentences offensive. As with the politeness analysis, Catholic
participants pattern closely with atheist participants, with only 0.3 percentage
points difference between them; these two groups return fewest offensiveness
judgements. Protestant participants and participants with no religion both
judged 20.0% of sentences offensive, making them the two groups to return the
most offensiveness judgements.
Sexuality presents almost the reverse picture from the politeness analysis.
Participants in the lesbian and other/queer groups were the most favouring of
offensiveness judgement with factor weights of 0.896 and 0.752 respectively
(participants who described themselves as other or queer returned the highest
percentage of offensiveness judgement responses at 37.5%), but were also the
two groups most favouring of politeness judgements. Here, gay participants were
the least favouring with only 13.3% offensiveness judgements, and a factor
weight of 0.176. Straight and heterosexual participants patterned differently with
heterosexual participants producing 23.3% of offensiveness judgements, and
straight participants producing just over half as many with 12.6%.
Political engagement also has some crossover categories. Participants in the
engaged–(not otherwise specified) category most favoured offensiveness
judgements, with a factor weight of 0.819 and Labour members were the most
disfavouring group with a factor weight of 0.272. The broad left group returned
the lowest percentage at 9.6%.
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Factor group Factor Tokens Percentage Factor
weight
Most polite 0 4514 21.5 0.672
(p = 4.35× 10−8) yes 646 2.9 0.328
Friend use 0 3881 24.9 0.713
(p = 6.48× 10−16) yes 1279 2.0 0.287
Acquaintance use 0 3798 25.3 0.666
(p = 1.01× 10−11) yes 1362 2.3 0.334
Grammatical A 516 25.0 0.756
pattern G 516 32.8 0.736
(p = 2.46× 10−76)
D 516 33.7 0.732
E 516 30.8 0.712
C 516 32.8 0.691
H 516 11.6 0.403
F 516 10.1 0.351
J 516 8.9 0.269
B 516 3.3 0.228
I 516 3.1 0.161
Place USA 720 27.1 0.825
(p = 8.22× 10−32)
England 2280 18.1 0.599
Canada 360 16.7 0.376
UK (nos) 600 17.0 0.364
Scotland 1200 18.5 0.29
Age 54+ 240 50.8 0.963
(p = 1.38× 10−113)
17–22 1680 23.9 0.688
23–28 1680 19.5 0.644
29–40 840 13.7 0.308
41–53 720 3.5 0.021
Religion Catholic 360 17.8 0.935
(p = 6.06× 10−19)
Protestant 480 19.6 0.515
None 2520 20.0 0.388
Atheist 1080 17.5 0.366
Jewish 240 20.0 0.320
Agnostic 480 19.2 0.274
Sexuality Lesbian 240 0.212 0.896
(p = 1.98× 10−22)
Other/Queer 240 37.5 0.752
(no label) 240 27.5 0.455
Heterosexual 1680 23.3 0.450
Asexual 360 18.9 0.428
Bisexual 240 20.0 0.374
Straight 1680 12.6 0.370
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Factor group Factor Tokens Percentage Factor
weight
Gay 480 13. 3 0.176
Political Engaged (nos) 360 29.4 0.819
engagement Green 240 22.9 0.747
(p = 1.38× 10−6)
Small-L liberal 480 15.4 0.507
Broad-left 480 9. 6 0.476
Socialist 240 15.4 0.449
None 2760 18.2 0.384
Democrat 360 30.0 0.297
Labour 240 26. 2 0.272
Overall
Deviance Degrees Probability R2
of freedom
3286.859 40 0.036 0.463
Table 8 Factors constraining variation in offensiveness judge-
ments, in reply to the question “Are any of these sentences
offensive, and if so, which ones?”
8.4 Dependent variable: friend use
Participants were asked “Can you imagine using any of these sentences to talk
about a friend, and if so, which ones?”, and the resulting data is recorded in
Table 9 as friend use. The significant factor groups for friend use were: lexical
cluster, grammatical pattern, politeness, acquaintance use, offensiveness,
ungrammaticality, place, age, religion, sexuality, and political engagement.
Overall, the model fit for this variable was significant with p = 0.043 and shows a
strong correlation with R2 = 0.747.
Friend use is the only dependent variable for which cluster is a significant factor
group (p = 0.000282). All of the clusters show the same behaviour, except for
the black cluster which disfavours friend use with a factor weight of 0.391, and
only 15.8% of black cluster sentences were judged suitable for friend use,
compared to the other clusters which have a factor weight of 0.609 and are
judged suitable for friend us in 25.6% of cases.
Sentences that are considered polite return a high percentage of friend use
Page 71 of 146
8.4 Dependent variable: friend use Exam number: 6388940
judgements at 66.4%, but this is only marginally favouring with a factor weight
of 0.559. Unsurprisingly, however, sentences judged offensive are hardly ever
judged suitable for friend use, with the near–categorical percentage of 2.6%. Also
unsurprising is that sentences considered to be ungrammatical were hardly ever
considered to be suitable for friend use, with a near–categorical 3.2% (factor
weight = 0.269).
Acquaintance use is the strongest predictor of friend use (p = 4.82× 10−279),
and 73.1% of sentences which are considered to be suitable for acquaintance use
are also judged suitable for friend use, yielding the strongly favouring factor
weight of 0.887.
Grammatical patterns, B ((Adjlabel)singular−complement−NP ) was judged suitable
for friend use in 69.4% of cases and was the most strongly favoured grammatical
pattern (factor weight = 0.907). The second–most selected pattern, pattern I
trails nearly 20 percentage points behind (50.0%, factor weight = 0.748); and
the second–most favoured pattern which was pattern A trails nearly 30
percentage points behind(39.7%, factor weight = 0.811). The most disfavoured
pattern was pattern C ((definite-Det + Adjlabel +
singular-Nproper−name)subject−NP ) with the near–categorical 2.5% and a factor
weight of 0.158. Pattern C was also among the most disfavoured patterns for the
politeness variable and most favoured for the offensiveness variable.
Scottish participants returned the most friend use judgements at 29.8% (factor
weight of 0.612); English students (23.3%, factor weight of 0.403) were less
likely to consider a sentence suitable for friend use than Scottish students.
Participants from the USA returned a friend use judgement on 22.5% of
sentences, and patterned closely to Canadian participants for this variable, with
only 0.3 percentage points’ difference between the two groups.
Friend use judgments increase with age, and the correlation is strong compared
to the other dependent variables (R2 = 0.83347). However, the factor weights
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present a different picture, with speakers aged 23–28 and 29–40 disfavouring
friend use judgements (factor weights of 0.398 and 0.217 respectively), the
youngest speakers almost neutral (0.513), and speakers in the 54+ and 41–53
groups favouring friend use judgments. This mixed evidence will be assessed in
more detain in the discussion in Section 9.
The pattern by religion is very similar to that seen in the politeness analysis, with
Catholic and atheist participants producing the most friend use judgements at
29.7% and 30.3% respectively (factor weights of 0.864, and 0.540 respectively).
Agnostic participants most disfavouring friend use judgements (factor weight =
0.150) and Protestant participants return the least friend use judgements with
18.1%.
Straight and heterosexual participants pattern differently, with straight
participants returning 30.6% friend use judgements, and heterosexual participants
returning 25.5% friend use judgements. The other/queer group shows the lowest
friend use judgements at 11.7%, as in the politeness analysis. Lesbian
participants pattern very differently from gay and bisexual participants at 28.3%
whereas the three groups had patterned similarly in the politeness analysis.
Labour party members return the most friend use judgements at 29.2% who had
also returned the most politeness judgements). They are followed closely by
unengaged participants (28.9%). Democrats are the most strongly disfavouring
of friend use judgements (10.6%, factor weight of 0.062), followed by green
participants (15.4%, factor weight of 0.238).
Factor group Factor Tokens Percentage Factor
weight
Cluster (All others) 4730 25.6 0.609
(p = 0.000282) Black 430 15.8 0.391
Most polite yes 646 66.4 0.559
(p = 0.00355) 0 4514 18.8 0.441
Offensive 0 4169 30.1 0.708
(p = 2.8× 10−13) yes 991 2.6 0.292
Acquaintance use yes 1362 76.6 0.887
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Factor group Factor Tokens Percentage Factor
weight
(p = 4.82× 10−279) 0 3798 6.2 0.113
Ungrammatical 0 4748 26.7 0.731
(p = 3.74× 10−11) yes 412 3.2 0.269
Grammatical B 516 69.4 0.907
pattern A 516 39.7 0.811
(p = 6.74× 10−80)
I 516 50.0 0.748
D 516 9.7 0.528
F 516 22.1 0.389
E 516 11.8 0.387
G 516 11.8 0.357
H 516 18.8 0.347
J 516 12.0 0.245
C 516 2.5 0.158
Place Canada 360 22.8 0.619
(p = 3.26× 10−10)
Scotland 1200 29.8 0.612
USA 720 22.5 0.607
England 2280 23.3 0.403
UK (nos) 600 24.3 0.272
Age 41–53 720 26.7 0.725
(p = 3.31× 10−12)
54+ 240 30.8 0.647
17–22 1680 21.5 0.531
23–28 1680 24.5 0.398
29–40 840 28.6 0.217
Religion Catholic 360 29.7 0.864
(p = 3.77× 10−17)
Jewish 240 25.0 0.843
Atheist 1080 30.3 0.540
None 2520 23.9 0.379
Protestant 480 18.1 0.187
Agnostic 480 20.0 0.150
Sexuality (no label) 240 35.0 0.961
(p = 8.86× 10−26)
Lesbian 240 28.3 0.774
Asexual 360 19.2 0.644
Straight 1680 30.6 0.607
Heterosexual 1680 25.5 0.461
Bisexual 240 12.5 0.243
Gay 480 11.9 0.200
Other/Queer 240 11.7 0.058
Political Engaged (nos) 360 25.6 0.859
engagement Labour 240 29.2 0.767
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Factor group Factor Tokens Percentage Factor
weight
(p = 3.02× 10−15)
None 2760 28.9 0.723
Socialist 240 25.0 0.642
Broad left 480 18.8 0.448
Small-L liberal 480 19.6 0.388
Green 240 15.4 0.238
Democrat 360 10.6 0.062
Overall
Deviance Degrees Probability R2
of freedom
2167.996 42 0.043 0.747
Table 9 Factors constraining variation in friend use judgements,
in reply to the question “Can you imagine using any of these
sentences to talk about a friend, and if so, which ones?””
8.5 Dependent variable: acquaintance use
The significant factor groups for acquaintance use were: grammatical pattern,
politeness, offensiveness, ungrammaticality, religion, sexuality, and political
engagement. The overall model is significant with p = 0.029. Unlike the
dependent variables we have seen so far, place and age were not significant; and
although friend use was a significant predictor (and its inclusion decreased the
deviance and increased the R2 value, suggesting an overall better fit model), I
have removed it as the two variables appear to be strongly co-linear (81.5% of
sentences that were judged suitable for friend use were also judged suitable for
acquaintance use and only 8.2% of sentences that were not judged suitable for
friend use were judged suitable for acquaintance use); and its inclusion would
have raised the probability above the acceptable threshold.
As with the friend use analysis, a politeness judgement response favours an
acquaintance use judgement with a factor weight of 0.673: 67.8% of sentences
that were judged polite were judged suitable for acquaintance use. But curiously,
20.5% of sentences that are not judged polite are judged suitable for
acquaintance use.
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Unsurprisingly, sentences judged offensive are nearly categorically not judged
usable for acquaintances, returning only 3.2% (factor weight = 0.256), but only
31.9% of sentences that are not judged offensive are judged suitable for
acquaintance use (factor weight =0.744). Similarly, sentences that were
considered ungrammatical also return the near–categorical 3.6% for acquaintance
use (factor weight = 0.251), but bizarrely, only 28.4% of sentences that were not
considered ungrammatical are considered suitable for acquaintance use (factor
weight = 0.749).
Of the grammatical patterns, B ((Adjlabel)singular−complement−NP is the most
favoured with a factor weight of 0.788 and judged suitable for acquaintance use
in 60.1% of cases; followed by pattern I ((indefinite-Det+ Adjlabel +
singular-N)complement−NP ) which is judged suitable for acquaintance use in 48.1%
of cases (factor weight of 0.726); patterns B and I were also the two most
favoured patterns for friend use. The least used pattern is pattern C (definite-Det
+ Adjlabel + singular-Nproper−name)subject−NP , at only 5.4% and with a
disfavouring factor weight of 0.210; which is also comparable to its ranking in the
friend use analysis.
The pattern by religion is somewhat different from what we have seen so far.
Catholic and atheist participants do not pattern together, and they return
relatively few acquaintance use judgements at 21.1% and 29.2% respectively (but
their factor weights are close, at 0.112 for Catholic participants, and 0.101 for
atheist participants). Here, it is Protestant and Jewish participants who pattern
most closely with 40.8% (factor weight = 0.995) and 35.4% (factor weight
=0.968) acquaintance use judgements, respectively.
The pattern by sexuality is somewhat different from that for the other variables.
This time straight participants and heterosexual do pattern similarly 29.5%
(factor weight = 0.877) and 25.7% (factor weight = 0.849) respectively. Lesbian,
gay, and bisexual participants also pattern together, unlike in the friend use.
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Political engagement patterns very similarly for this variable to the patterns in
the friend use analysis. In both analyses, Democrats and green participants are
the most strongly disfavouring (here, the factor weight is 0.057 for Democrats,
and 0.129 for green participants). The broad left participants return the lowest
percentage of acquaintance use, with only 11.2%. Labour party members and
unengaged participants return the highest acquaintance use judgements at 28.8%
and 31.9% respectively.
Factor group Factor Tokens Percentage Factor
weight
Most polite yes 646 67.8 0.673
(p = 3.44× 10−36) 0 4514 20.5 0.327
Offensive 0 4169 31.9 0.744
(p = 1.79× 10−42) yes 991 3.2 0.256
Ungrammatical 0 4748 28.4 0.749
(p = 1.84× 10−21) yes 412 3.6 0.251
Grammatical B 516 60.1 0.788
pattern I 516 48.1 0.726
(p = 8.25× 10−63)
A 516 34.1 0.673
F 516 29.1 0.527
H 516 26.2 0.506
J 516 21.9 0.445
G 516 15.7 0.419
E 516 14.5 0.416
D 516 8.9 0.284
C 516 5.4 0.210
Religion Protestant 480 40.8 0.995
(p = 2.52× 10−86)
Jewish 240 35.4 0.968
Catholic 360 21.1 0.112
None 2520 23.3 0.110
Atheist 1080 29.2 0.101
Agnostic 480 21.5 0.080
Sexuality (no label) 240 33.8 0.993
(p = 1.29× 10−79)
Straight 1680 29.5 0.877
Heterosexual 1680 25.7 0.849
Atheist 360 21.1 0.828
Bisexual 240 21.7 0.791
Lesbian 240 20.8 0.042
Gay 480 22.3 0.018
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Factor group Factor Tokens Percentage Factor
weight
Other/Queer 240 28.8 0.012
Political Engaged (nos) 360 23.9 0.853
engagement None 2760 31.9 0.816
(p = 1.95× 10−76)
Small-L liberal 480 24.2 0.783
Broad left 480 11.2 0.682
Labour 240 28.8 0.499
Socialist 240 24.6 0.360
Green 240 14.6 0.129
Democrat 360 17.2 0.057
Overall
Deviance Degrees Probability R2
of freedom
3996.67 32 0.029 0.461
Table 10 Factors constraining variation in acquaintance use
judgements, in reply to the question “Can you imagine using
any of these sentences to talk about someone you know only
slightly, and if so, which ones?”
8.6 Dependent variable: ungrammaticality
The significant factor groups for ungrammaticality were: grammatical pattern,
lexical class, politeness, most polite, friend use, acquaintance use, place, age,
religion, and political engagement. The overall probability for the model is
p = 0.010, which is well below the significance threshold, although of all the
dependent variable models it shows the weakest correlation.
As one would expect, most of the factors return low percentages compared to the
other dependent variables. So while for the other dependent variables, seeing so
many factors return counts less than 10% might be cause for concern, here it is
not (although it perhaps does explain the low R2 value) — one expects
ungrammaticality judgements to be rare with the set of sentences that have been
presented.
Unsurprisingly, sentences which are considered to be polite, suitable for friend
use, or suitable for acquaintance use are all near–categorically not considered to
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be ungrammatical, at 1.5%, 1.0%, and 1.1% respectively.
Three of the grammatical patterns show strikingly high propensity to be judged
ungrammatical; these are patterns C((definite-Det + Adjlabel +
singular-Nproper−name)subject−NP ) at 24.0%, A ((indefinite-Det +
singular-Nlabel)complement−NP ) at 16.1%, and D ((Adjlabel +
singular-Nproper−name)subject−NP ) at 12.4%. Of these, A and C both have
strongly favouring factor weights of 0.831 and 0.826 respectively, with D at the
slightly lower but still favouring 0.678. Four patterns seem to be
near–categorical, returning counts of less than 5.0%, these were patterns G
(4.8%), I (1.0%), H (1.2%), and F (1.0%).
Lexical class is significant only for this dependent variable. The Type III
ethnonym (Chinese) clocks a high level of ungrammaticality judgements at
17.2% and a factor weight of 0.695, followed after a wide margin by Type I
ethnonyms (German, Jew, Scot). Type II ethnonyms (eg, Scottish, Jewish) were
the most grammatically acceptable according to the percentage count, but the
factor weight of 0.473 is close to neutral. Type 0 is the category for
non-ethnonym labels that have the same formal properties as Type I ethnonyms
(eg vegetarian, emo), and unsurprisingly, they behave similarly.
Scottish and Canadian participants were the most likely to consider sentences
ungrammatical, producing ungrammaticality judgements 13.3% (factor weight =
0.628) and 13.9% (factor weight = 0.687) of the time, respectively. Participants
from the USA were the least likely to consider the sentences ungrammatical,
producing ungrammaticality judgements in 4.0% of cases, which is
near–categorical. English participants are only slightly more likely to consider the
sentences ungrammatical, at 5.8%.
It is difficult to draw conclusions based on age as some of the percentages are
near–categorical, but this again seems to be a U-shaped curve, with the
participants in the 54+ group (who judged sentences ungrammatical in 12.1%of
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cases) behaving most like the participants in 17–22 group (who judged sentences
ungrammatical in 10.5 % of cases), rather than like the participants who are
chronologically closest to them. This does not look like a change over time, since
the line of best fit is nearly level, and the correlation is extremely weak
(R2 = 0.00319). This U–shaped curve is much more characteristic of
age–grading.
Catholic and Jewish participants were most likely to consider one of the
sentences to be ungrammatical, at 13.1% (factor weight = 0.815) and 10.4%
(factor weight = 0.756). Participants who described themselves as having no
religion, atheist, or agnostic, pattern closely together; with all three groups
returning percentages at 8.1% or lower, and disfavouring factor weights.
Participants who fall into the engaged (not otherwise specified) category returned
the highest levels of ungrammaticality judgements, at 13.3% (factor weight =
0.772), followed by Labour Party members at 10.0% (factor weight = 0.652),
and participants who were not politically engaged at 9.7% (factor weight =
0.679). Democrats and broad left participants were near–categorical non-users of
ungrammaticality judgements at only 3.3% (factor weight = 0.228) and 1.0%
respectively (factor weight = 0.086).
Factor group Factor Tokens Percentage Factor
weight
Most polite 0 4514 8.9 0.657
(p = 7.63× 10−5) yes 646 1.5 0.343
Friend use 0 3881 10.3 0.733
(p = 9.37× 10−13) yes 1279 1.0 0.267
Acquaintance use 0 3798 10.5 0.631
(p = 0.000143) yes 1362 1.1 0.369
Grammatical A 516 16.1 0.831
pattern C 516 24.0 0.826
(p = 4.03× 10−58)
B 516 5.8 0.750
D 516 12.4 0.678
E 516 8.5 0.572
J 516 5.0 0.437
G 516 4.8 0.422
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Factor group Factor Tokens Percentage Factor
weight
I 516 1.0 0.217
H 516 1.2 0.161
F 516 1.0 0.143
Lexical Class Type III 430 17.2 0.695
(p = 4.96× 10−10)
Type II 516 4.1 0.473
Type I 1634 9.2 0.431
(Type 0) 2580 6.5 0.393
Place Canada 360 13.9 0.687
(p = 1.25× 10−10)
Scotland 1200 13.3 0.628
UK (nos) 600 6.8 0.427
England 2280 5.8 0.400
USA 720 4.0 0.352
Age 54+ 240 12.1 0.669
(p = 2.42× 10−11)
17–22 1680 10.5 0.665
23–28 1680 7.1 0.522
41–53 720 2.6 0.385
29–40 840 8.2 0.266
Religion Catholic 360 13.1 0.815
(p = 2.16× 10−13)
Jewish 240 10.4 0.756
Protestant 480 7.1 0.436
Atheist 1080 6.7 0.372
None 2520 8.1 0.307
Agnostic 480 6.0 0.266
Political Socialist 240 5.4 0.790
engagement Engaged (nos) 360 13.3 0.772
(p = 1.42× 10−24)
None 2760 9.7 0.679
Labour 240 10.0 0.652
Green 240 5.8 0.581
Small-L liberal 480 5.6 0.341
Democrat 360 3.3 0.228
Broad left 480 1.0 0.086
Overall
Deviance Degrees Probability R2
of freedom
2001.078 36 0.010 0.364
Table 11 Factors constraining variation in friend use judge-
ments, in reply to the question “Can you imagine using any of
these sentences to talk about a friend, and if so, which ones?””
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9 Discussion
9.1 The dependent variables
Although ungrammaticality is not a significant factor group for offensiveness,
(p = 0.278), ungrammatical sentences are judged to be offensive in 37.6% of
cases, and the focus group participants give discursive evidence that
grammatically anomalous sentence seem “off” to them in Extract 4. It is unclear
why participants would consider ungrammatical sentences to be offensive, rather
than value–neutral, but this is in keeping with Schütze’s (2010) observation that
lay speakers’ grammaticality judgements may be influenced by pragmatic factors,
and Hall-Lew and Norcliffe’s finding that ungrammaticality and offensiveness may
be proxies for one another to some extent (2006).
Politeness, friend use, and acquaintance use are all strong predictors for each
other. Offensiveness and ungrammaticality seem to correlate negatively with
these three, as one might expect. The non-independence of the variables
suggests that they are multicolinear. However, it seems that participants
distinguish between what is not polite and what is offensive, since only 15.0% of
sentences that are not judged offensive are judged polite. It also seems that
many participants do distinguish between friend use and acquaintance use, since
some factors patterned differently between the two groups, and notably, lexical
cluster is significant for friend use but not for acquaintance use.
9.2 Distal and proximal use
In order to claim evidence of distal use — forms that mark social distance — one
would expect to see a notable difference between forms that are judged suitable
for friend use, and forms that are judged suitable for acquaintance use. The
evidence for this is somewhat mixed.
The predictors for friend use and the predictors for acquaintance use are
extremely similar, and acquaintance use is an extremely strong predictor for
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friend use (p = 4.82× 10−279) suggesting that participants are treating them
similarly. However, if friend use and acquaintance use are plotted against
grammatical pattern, there appears to be some interaction. Notably, grammatical
pattern F appears to behave differently in the friend use and acquaintance use
environment; it is only rarely judged suitable for friend use (11.9% of cases are
judged suitable for friend use), but it is judged as suitable for acquaintance use in
29.1% of cases. It is possible, therefore, that pattern F is specifically associated
with social distance uses, and not with social proximity. This is tentative, at best.
Figure 5: Showing friend use and acquaintance use judgments by grammatical
pattern
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Figure 6: Showing friend use and aquaintance use judgments by grammatical
pattern
In the discourse evidence from Extract 11, participants do note that forms that
would ordinarily be offensive can be suitable for use with people they are close to,
suggesting that some forms can mark social proximity in particular contexts.
However, there is not enough statistical evidence to generalise this observation,
since, according to the statistical analysis, offensive forms are almost
categorically not judged suitable for friend use — only 2.6% of offensive
sentences are judged suitable for friend use.
9.3 Zero response
The responses for the politeness, friend use, acquaintance use, offensiveness, and
ungrammaticality factor groups were tallied by, for each sentences a participant
was shown, considering whether the participant had selected the sentence for one
(or more) of the five judgement types. I use the term “zero response” for when a
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sentence was not selected.
There is a high rate of zero response for all the dependent variables, and a
number of participants remarked that they simply would not use the options on
offer. Some of the survey responses exemplify this sentiment:
“[T]here wasn’t an option of ““I wouldn’t say this”” not that I find it
offensive, or necessarily polite, just that I would never say it.”
[Response 24]13
“[M]any of the sentences, while grammatically correct, are quite
forced and would never occur in real life. I can’t imagine the
circumstances when I would say ‘The Xs go to the library’ or ‘X Bob
goes to the library’ for any X. Not because such sentences are
necessarily offensive, they’re just odd things to say.” [Response 59]
“What about a category ““Would never say this!””” [Response 142]
The three participants above all report that there are some sentences they simply
would not say, even though they are not necessarily offensive. This is consistent
with Schütze’s observation that ordinary speakers do not necessarily make a
bivalent distinction between “acceptable” and “unacceptable” sentences, but
rather may view acceptability as a spectrum, with some sentences being best
described as “not ones that I would say” but neither “ungrammatical” nor fully
acceptable.
It seems possible, therefore, this is not an anomalous result, but rather suggestive
of participants treating options as something approaching an ordinal scale,
13Here and in all quotes from written responses, I have kept kept the participants’ original
spelling, capitalisation, and punctuation in quotes. This is partly because non-standard usage
sometimes conveys differences in meaning and affective content and also to preserve the original
“flavour” of participants’ comments, as one would with a conversation analysis or discourse
analysis transcription.
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ranging from offensive’ or ungrammatical (or both simultaneously) to polite, with
friend use and acquaintance use and zero responses somewhere in the middle.
However, it is not entirely clear that all the participants conceptualise the ordinal
scale in the same way, and indeed it is not clear that all the participants have
approached the task as an ordinal task. For example, some participants have only
marked sentences as either polite or offensive, not selecting any other options,
and never selecting more than one option at a time; suggesting that they regard
the options as bivalent rather than as a spectrum. Additionally, even assuming
some participants had approached the task as ordinal, it is not at all clear what
they consider to be at the two extremes — some participants have marked nearly
all the sentences they considered to be offensive as also being ungrammatical,
whereas other participants have treated grammaticality and offensiveness more
independently, so it is unclear whether the extreme should be taken to be
offensiveness, or ungrammaticality, or offensive and ungrammatical. For these
reasons I have treated the data as ratio data rather than ordinal data.
Some participants also reported that they would not use certain sentences except
in very particular contexts, such as in the comment below:
“There are some phrases I just wouldn’t say in general, but in a
specific context, I might say them. For example, I would tend not to
use the term ““white”” to describe someone, but if I knew that the
other person in the conversation was talking about two different
Janets and was in a hurry, she might say ““is it white Janet or black
Janet?””. Knowing she is not using the term in a derogatory way,
but just as a quick shorthand, I would resist the term, but might just
find myself saying ““black Janet”” even though it would not sit well
or be my choice.” [Response65]
In such a case, zero response does not appear to be indicative of an ordinal
approach to the questions, but rather a reaction to “a specific context” and
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whether accommodation is appropriate in that context: that is, a decision as to
whether to “resist the term” or use it “even though it would not sit well or be
[her] choice”.
Some participants also reported discomfort with the use of demographic labels,
either for certain demographic groups, or for particular contexts, as a reason for
zero-response:
“With the exception of those that were offensive, I didn’t think I
would use the sentences involving going to the library because I felt
that in such cases, the adjectives: lesbian, gay, black, white, chinese,
protestant, catholic etc were simply not relevant information.”
[Response 182]
“Typically, I would not use racial or cultural qualifiers unless it was
relevant to the discussion.” [Response 196]
Here, as in Response 65, there seems to be requirement for the identity label to
be “relevant” in the context, and the absence of obvious relevance seems to
render a sentence unusable. Response 185 below explains how relevance might
affect usage:
“[I]t’s not clear whether the context is ‘a group of gay students are
headed to the library now’ or ‘gay students often frequent the
library’. This makes a difference in usage, since the first is an
observation (‘the jewish students have left synagogue and are going
to the library’) and the second is a generalisation and thus liable to
stereotyping (‘those nerdy chinese kids hang around in libraries all the
time’). [Response 185]
While the participant does not say whether there is affective difference between
her observation case and her generalisation case, or which one she considers more
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acceptable, she does does note that it “makes a difference in usage”. Some
speakers have strong taboos against both generalisations and stereotyping, or
may not make a distinction between the two, particularly for certain social
characteristics (eg, race).14 Because of this usage difference, there was a risk
that, if the sentences were highly stereotyped, participants’ responses might be
due to whether or not they recognised the stereotype and thought it acceptable
to stereotype, as well as to the factors currently in play. For that reason, I
attempted to make the sentences as neutral as possible with respect to
stereotyping; this introduces the risk that the sentences will be judged
unacceptable because the identity labels are not “relevant”, as response 182 and
196 show, but it was important to control for the stereotyping effect. However,
the manipulation of stereotype versus generalisation might be an important
direction for future research.
9.4 Grammatical patterns
Pattern B ((sing adjlabel)complNP )is consistently selected as a preferred pattern, as
shown by its by it being the most commonly selected pattern for the politeness
variable (50.2% polite judgement responses, factor weight of 0.907), and the
most strongly favoured pattern for friend use (69.4% friend use judgement
responses, factor weight of 0.907) and acquaintance use (60.1% acquaintance
use judgement responses, factor weight of 0.788). This shows a strong positive
association with politeness and suitability for use. A negative association with
unsuitability can also be seen in pattern B being very rarely selected as offensive
(3.3% offensive judgement responses, factor weight of 0.228) or ungrammatical
(5.8% ungrammaticality judgement responses).
Pattern I ((indef det+ adjlabel + sing N) complNP ) shows a very similar pattern. It
14In my own schooling in the South of the USA, which to some extent remains de facto
segregated in education, it was strongly inculcated in young children that any statement about a
racial group was racist. This included factual claims such as “This is a majority–white school”,
and, to an equal extent, factually inaccurate and negatively biased descriptions of majority–
black schools as violent. In other words, the language ideology that I was then taught did not
distinguish race–based generalisations from stereotypes.
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is the second most commonly selected construction for the politeness variable
(21.7%), the friend use variable (50.0%), and the acquaintance use variable
(48.1%); showing a positive association with politeness and suitability for use.
It’s negative correlation with unsuitability for use is extremely strong — indeed it
seems to be almost invariant, and is selected on only 1.0% of cases as
ungrammatical, and is the least selected factor for the offensiveness variable, at
only 3.1%.
By contrast, pattern A ((indef det + sing Nlabel)complNP ) appears to have a
positive correlation with both suitability and unsuitability for use. It is selected
21.5% of the time as the most polite option (behaving much like pattern I);
39.7% of the time for friend use, and 34.1% of the time for acquaintance use,
consistently ranking as the third most used pattern after patterns B and I for
these variables. However, it is also the most favoured option for ungrammaticality
(factor weight of 0.831) and for offensiveness (factor weight of 0.756).
Patterns C, D, E, and G all return near–categorically low percentages in the
politeness and acquaintance use analyses, and the four lowest percentages in the
friend use analysis. This suggests that they are either invariant, or have a strong
negative correlation with suitability for use. The latter interpretation is reinforced
by these four patterns returning the four highest percentages in the offensiveness
analysis. Of these four patterns, all except C return relatively low percentages for
ungrammaticality judgements, but C returns a 24.0%, the second highest
percentage for that variable.
Patterns F, H, and J all pattern closely together. They return low percentages
for politeness (11.0%, 7.0%, 6.4%, respectively), middling scores for friend use
(22.1%, 18.8%, 12.0%, respectively), and middling scores again for acquaintance
use (29.1%, 26.2%, 21.9%, respectively). They also return near–categorically low
percentages for ungrammaticality, and relatively low percentages for offensiveness
(10.1%, 11.6%, 8.9%, respectively). It may be that these patterns simply are not
commonly used by the participants.
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Most of the grammatical patterns are judged similarly for friend use and
acquaintance use, but a few are judged differently. Notably, pattern F shows a
dramatic difference between the two: it judged as suitable for friend use in 11.9%
of cases, which is relatively low, but suitable for acquaintance use in 29.1% of
cases — nearly three times as often. No other pattern shows such a dramatic
change between the two contexts. It is possible, therefore, that pattern F is
specifically associated with social distance.
9.5 Cluster
Cluster is only significant in the friend use analysis, where it has a probability of
p = 0.000282. The black cluster is selected for friend use suitability in only
15.8% of cases, whereas the other clusters are selected in 25.6% of cases.
In the discourse section, participants select certain constructions containing
“black” as being unacceptable, because of grammatical constraints (in line 76 of
the transcript, Gareth remarks that “a black” is not acceptable for him), but also
because of ideologies about using race as a distinguishing feature (see Extract 7).
If cluster is plotted against grammatical pattern, it because clear that patten A
shows a much greater disparity by cluster than the other grammatical patterns do.
The unacceptability of x is a black compared to other pattern A constructions
may explain provide at least a partial explanation for the black cluster patterning
differently from other clusters.
9.6 Lexical class
This factor group is only significant for the ungrammaticality variable. Chinese,
which is the Type III ethnonym receives the highest levels of ungrammaticality
judgements. Hall-Lew and Norcliffe’s results (2006) should lead us to expect
singular constructions (that is, patterns A, B, C, D, I, and J) to be more likely to
be considered ungrammatical.
If lexical class and grammatical pattern are cross-tabulated, Chinese shows much
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higher ungrammaticality judgements than the other lexical classes for
grammatical patterns A, C, and E:
A) (indefinite-Det + singular-Nlabel)complement−NP
C) (definite-Det + Adjlabel + singular-Nproper−name)subject−NP
E) (plural-Nlabel) subject−NP
Patterns A and C are singular constructions, and the ungrammaticality
judgements for Harry is a Chinese and The Chinese Harry goes to the library fit
with Hall-Lew and Norcliffe’s findings (2006) and with what the participants
reported in the focus group. They report that Chinese Harry can be used as
contrastive, to distinguish two Harrys, but is not permissible if one only knows
one person called Harry (see Extract 5) — this probably also explains the slightly
elevated ungrammaticality levels for all the lexical classes for pattern D. Hall-Lew
and Norcliffe found that non-adjectival Type II and III ethnonyms “gain[ed]
acceptability as the number approaches a ‘mass’–like, non-individuating quantity”
(2006, p. 22), and since Harry is a Chinese is highly individuating, this explains
the the high ungrammaticality rating.
Pattern E, however, is plural and “non-individuating” (Hall-Lew & Norcliffe 2006,
p. 22), but does not fit with the expected pattern from Hall-Lew and Norcliffe’s
findings. It seems, therefore, that the Type III ethnonym requires a determiner in
its plural nominal form. Because there is only one Type III ethnonym in the
sentence list, it is impossible to tell for certain whether this property is specific to
the lexeme Chinese, or whether it is a property of the whole Type III class.
Patterns B, I, and J, which are all also singular, do not show a notable difference
between the behaviour of the Type II and III ethnonyms and Type I ethnonyms
(although pattern B shows a difference between ethnonyms and non-ethnonyms).
However, pattern B (x is [label ]) is consistently selected as the most polite
pattern, and since grammaticality and politeness are connected, this may explain
why it is not considered to be ungrammatical. Patterns I and J show
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near–categorically low levels of ungrammaticality judgements for all the formal
classes, and are among the patterns that do not seem to show much variation
overall, and I posited that they might be less ideologically–laden; however, it still
is strange that patterns that seem to be less ideologically laden would be less
likely to be considered ungrammatical.
For all patterns except pattern D Type II ethnonyms otherwise pattern closely
with Type I ethnonyms and non-ethnonyms (marked as Type 0); although this is
not consistent with Hall-Lew and Norcliffe’s findings (2006), it is not unexpected
since both of the Type II ethnonyms used here — Jewish and Scottish — also
appeared in their Type I forms Jew and Scot, although patterning by cluster was
not significant for these two lexemes overall.
Overall, these results show some correlation with Hall-Lew and Norcliffe’s
findings, but there are some inconsistencies too. Tuite’s original claim that Type
III ethnonyms have a formally identical singular and plural (1995); and that Type
II ethnonyms can be used as collective plurals only, seem insufficient to explain
this pattern; since there does seem to be evidence that both Type II and Type III
ethnonyms can be used politely and grammatically with pattern B in the singular,
and grammatically if not politely with patterns I and J.
9.7 Grammatical category, plurality, determiner presence
None of grammatical category, plurality, determiner presence were significant for
any dependent variable. It may be that none of these can successfully convey
stance on their own, and that it is crucial to stance that it is conveyed by clusters
of linguistic resources (Moore & Podesva 2009, p. 448, make a similar point
about style).
9.8 Sociolinguistic factors
Place, and political engagement are non-independent, due to the place-specificity
of political affiliation. So only North American participants describe themselves
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as Hispanic (a category that does not appear to be very salient in the UK), only
British participants describe their political engagement in terms of Scottish Green
Party membership, or indeed as the following:
“Non–partisan but liberal, as in left not as in the Liberal
Democrats— I hate them with a deep and burning passion”
[Response 164]
9.8.1 Place
Figure 7: Showing acceptability judgements by place and context
Place is significant for all the dependent variables except for acquaintance use.
On the whole, Scottish and English participants pattern differently for most of
the dependent variables, but converge on offensive judgements. North American
participants also pattern differently, but converge on friend use.
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Participants from the USA may have perceived the sentences as overall more
offensive (but not more ungrammatical) than other speakers, since they returned
least politeness and friend use judgements, but the most offensiveness
judgements. Canadian participants seem to show the least affective responses
towards the sentence, since their responses show relatively little variation between
contexts compared to the other participants, on the figure, the line for Canda,
shown in purple, is relatively flat compared to the sharp peaks for Scotland,
England, and the USA. It may be that the sentences were more
stance–conducing for participants from Scotland, England, and the USA, but this
is highly tentative, and would need to be much more rigorously tested with a
sample that is more balanced by place.
9.8.2 Religion
Participants who described themselves as atheist, agnostic or as having no
religion follow a similar pattern for all the dependent variables, converging for
offensiveness and ungrammaticality. Catholic participants patterned more closely
to atheist participants than they did to Protestant participants; and Jewish
participants patterned closely with Protestant participants. As two of the three
of Catholic participants were, in their own words, “somewhat lapsed” or “not
religious”, this split between the behaviour of Protestant and Catholic
participants might reflect a difference between religiously practicing and
non-practicing participants, rather than between Catholic and Protestant
speakers, but there is insufficient data to tell (this data is based on small groups
of speakers), and these possibilities should be taken as highly speculative.
It would therefore be interesting to see whether active involvement in a religious
community (as opposed to merely having a religious affiliation) influences the
results that people might give. That is, whether, someone who considers religious
or secular affiliation and involvement, including perhaps involvement in secular
Humanism or radical atheism (as popularised by Richard Dawkins) to be a major
component of their life, produces substantially different results from people who
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Figure 8: Showing acceptability judgements by religion and context
consider religious involvement or background to be minor components of their
lives, or those who consider secularity to be a major component to their lives.
9.8.3 Sexuality
Of all the sexuality groups, the other/queer group returns far more offensiveness
judgements; so they may be perceiving the sentences as worse overall, since they
produce very few friend use and politeness judgements; alternatively, as they
show the greatest difference between their politeness judgements and
offensiveness judgements (28.7 percentage points, compared to only 0.8
percentage points for straight participants), the sentences may be more
stance–conducing for them than for other participants. Like bisexual and gay
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Figure 9: Showing acceptability judgements by sexuality and context
participants, the other/queer group show an S-shaped curve: they give few
politeness and friend use judgements, but rather higher levels of acquaintance use
and offensive judgements. This is unexpected, since acquaintance use and friend
use are strongly non-independent, and one would expect to see similar levels of
use reported for both friend use and acquaintance use.
Lesbian participants show almost the opposite pattern to gay and bisexual
participants: they give relatively high friend use judgements, but lower
acquaintance use judgments; again, this is unexpected.
If straight participants and heterosexual participants are compared to each other,
with the other participants taken out of the equation and compared directly to
each other, we see that the pattern differently, and that the difference is
significant (χ2 = 73.9, degrees of freedom = 3, p = 0.000 to 3 decimal places).
It is unclear why straight participants and heterosexual participants pattern
differently.
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Figure 10: Showing friend use and aquaintance use judgments by grammatical
pattern
9.8.4 Political engagement
Political engagement is something of a mixed bag in terms of results; the factor
group is significant for all the dependent variables but it is difficult to draw
conclusions about clear trends.
Nearly all the engagement groups show fewer politeness judgements than friend
use, but green participants and Democrats show little difference between the two.
Four of the eight groups (Labour, engaged not otherwise specified, socialist, and
green) show little difference between friend use judgements and acquaintance use
judgements; Democrats, small-L liberals, and participants who are not engaged
all return more acquaintance use judgements than friend use judgements, and an
even higher percentage of offensiveness judgements than acquaintance use
judgements.
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Figure 11: Showing acceptability judgements by political engagement and context
There does appear to some interaction between engagement and grammatical
pattern: when the dependent variables are cross-tabulated against grammatical
pattern and grouped according to political engagement, we see that Labour is an
produces far higher politeness, friend use, and acquaintance use judgements for
pattern I, and relatively high ungrammaticality judgements for pattern G.
It would be interesting to see the survey repeated with participants who
described themselves as being actively involved in, for example, racial justice or
queer/LGBTQIAetc rights campaigns, since such campaigns often have extensive
language ideologies about how one ought to speak (or not) about particular
social groups.
9.8.5 Age
For a change in progress, one would expect to see an S–shaped curve when a
dependent variable is plotted against age; whereas age–grading patterns typically
show high use of a feature in younger and older speakers. However, due to low
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numbers of participants in the higher age brackets, it is difficult to draw clear
conclusions about variation according to age, since the very highest bracket
which contains only two participants, could be anomalous.
Politeness shows a steady increase for the first three age groups, but then lower
percentages for the higher age groups — it is unclear whether this is anomalous
or due to age grade. Friend use shows an upward trend as age increases, and
could be said to show the S-shaped curves with respect to age that would be
expected for a change in progress. Offensiveness seems to show a downward
trend as age increases, apart from the highest age bracket. This last point could
be anomalous, or it could be that this variable is age–graded, and not a change
in progress. Ungrammaticality also shows the U-shaped curve more commonly
associated with age–grading.
There does not therefore appear to be adequate evidence for a change in
progress, but a larger sample that is more balanced with respect to age will be
needed to test this.
9.8.6 Ethnicity/race
It was not possible to include ethnicity/race in the statistical analysis due to the
number of singleton groups that could not be collapsed or recoded. However, the
discursive construction of ethnicity/race may affect usage, and for that reason, I
will comment on construction briefly here.
Participants were asked “How would you describe your race/ethnicity?”, and
many participants responded with terms that were nationality–focused such as
“Scottish”, “British”, or “Chinese”. Eight of 54 participants15 (14.8%) gave
their ethnicity/race in these purely nationality–focused terms, and a further 16
participants (29.6%) giving a combination of color + nationality terms such as
“White Scottish” or “White Southern English”. Nine participants (16.7%) give
15For the discussion of ethnicity/race, I will consider also those responses that had been
excluded from the statistical analysis, since my focus here is discursive construction, not statistics.
For this reason, the number of participants is given as 54, not 43.
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Figure 12: Showing acceptability judgements by age and context
their race/ethnicity in ancestry terms (eg, “Euro-American”, “Caucasian”,
“Hispanic”), and 16 (29.6%) use only colour terms (“white”). A few other types
of description are used – a full list is given in 12.
The focus group participants described a usage distinction between Jew and
Jewish in terms of a difference between race and religion (Extract 8). While it is
impossible to gather statistical evidence on whether this is a widespread usage
distinction, it may be noteworthy that one participant gave their race/ethnicity
information as “White/Jewish”, suggesting that for at least some speakers,
Jewishness can be an ethnicity, although another Jewish participant gave their
race/ethnicity as “British”, so the view of Jewishness as an ethnicity is not
necessarily universal.
These subtleties in the construction of ethnicity/race mean that language
ideologies about which attributes are appropriate to use as distinguishing features
Page 100 of 146
9.8 Sociolinguistic factors Exam number: 6388940
in Extract 7, may be affected by ambiguous cases, such as whether Jew(ish) is
considered to be an ethnicity/race term or a religion term (see Extract 8), or
whether Chinese and Scottish are ethnicity/race terms or nationality terms. For
that matter, since several of the participants use nationality–focused terms as
ethnicity/race terms, so German could potentially be ambiguous in this respect
too.
Further work would be required to draw any conclusions from this data, but there
seems to be some evidence to tentatively suggest that construction affects usage,








Canadian with Spanish background (parents are from Spain)16
















16It is unclear whether this should be classed with nationality–focused terms or ancestry–
focused, as it has properties of both.
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caucasian
Hispanic







I wouldn’t, but am usually pigeonholed in surveys to
””caucasion”” or ””white”” or ””other”” if the only choice
is ””White British”” or ””Black British””
Table 12 List of ethnicity/race terms used by survey partic-
ipants in response to the question “How would you describe
your race/ethnicity?”
9.8.7 Inter-speaker variation
It was not possible to include inter-speaker variation in the statistical analysis.
9.8.8 Gender
Gender was not significant for any of the dependent variables. This is in keeping
with Hall-Lew and Norcliffe’s finding that there was no apparent difference by sex
for either politeness or gramamticality judgements (2006, p. 19).
9.9 Problematisation of labels
Several participants seem to resist “naive” demographic categorisation. For
example, in reply to the question “How would you describe your sexuality/sexual
orientation?” the following replies do not fall comfortably within the dominant
narrative of everyone having a sexual orientation that is stable over time and
according to which they can be categorised:
“I don’t” [Response 38]
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“Other” [Response 187]
Similarly for ethnicity; in reply to the question “How would you describe your
race/ethnicity?”, one participant replied,
“I wouldn’t, but am usually pigeonholed in surveys to ““caucasion””
or ““white”” or ““other”” if the only choice is ““White British”” or
““Black British”” ” [Response 65]
And in reply to the question “How would you describe your religion, if any?”:
Tricky one. ““Theist”” is the most straightforward, but doesn’t
really fall into any ““religion”” as it tends to be defined. Not
Christian. Tricky. [Response 65]
Cameron and Kulick’s critique (2003) of relying on broad identity groupings such
as bisexual and lesbian is therefore directly relevant, as at least a few participants
do not seem to claim these labels for themselves when given a choice. Even if
such participants represented a small proportion of the total group of
participants, they had a disproportionate effect on the statistical analysis and
methodology: coding such responses for use with Rbrul turned out to be a tricky
balance between ethnographic and statistical responsibility. On the one hand,
ethnographic and and ethical concerns require me to take seriously the terms
that participants use for themselves; on the other, coding such responses for the
statistical analysis raised a number of questions as to whether to treat such
responses as singleton groups in the statistical analysis, or recode them together
with other responses (and whether this would constitute the “pigeonholing” from
Response 65)
It might please these participants to know, therefore, that they raise a number of
methodological questions, since there is a large extent to which regression
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modelling depends on speakers being categorisable into the factor groups that are
then used in the statistical analysis. I would not wish to discount statistical
methods entirely (quite the contrary!); but it may be that linguists must always
be prepared to combine statistical analysis with discursive methods, or must
consider more carefully how to gather demographic data for statistical analysis.
While some of these response were integrated into the statistical analysis, they
are also worth examining in purely discursive terms. Compared to whom or what
is the participant who wrote response 187 “Other”? Response 38 runs contrary
to the dominant discourse in most Anglo-European culture that everyone has a
sexuality/sexual orientation that is broadly categorisable in terms such as
heterosexual, bisexual, gay, etc. While this amount of data is not sufficient to
make the kind of shift in focus from identity to social construction that Kulick &
Cameron advocate (2003), nor is it clear how that would work for a project such
as this one which is specifically about the lexicosyntactic and pragmatic properties
of identity labels, it is worth noting the effect nonetheless, as it suggests that a
number of lay speakers are actively engaged in problematising identity labels.
9.10 Evidence for reclamatory use?
There is no robust evidence for reclamatory use in the statistical analysis, since
offensive sentences are only judged suitable for friend use in 2.0% of cases, which
is near–categorically. However, this may be due to limitations of the survey
method: it is that it is difficult to know how a speaker would judge a sentence
they believed to be reclamatory, and whether the correct test really is to look to
offensive sentences that are suitable for friend use, or whether a better
measurement would be whether someone would use a traditionally–offensive term
of themselves (if referentially accurate), rather than whether they would use an
offensive term for a friend. I had opted not to ask participants if they would use
the terms for themselves, since this might require a counterfactual conditional
(“if you were a member of this social group, would you use this sentence about
yourself?” and I was concerned this might be confusing. However, it may be that
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this is the only way to gather the relevant data for statistical purposes.
There is some discursive evidence for reclaiming, however. One survey participant
did indicate in the free text option that:
“As a Jewish lesbian, I feel I should point out that I have a personal
pet hate of being referred to as ‘the Jews’ when out with other
Jewish people. But, that frequently myself and my LGBTQIAP
friends will refer to our group of friends as ‘the gays’.”
[Response 164]
This suggests that the participant finds it acceptable in certain circumstances to
use a construction that is otherwise offensive, about themselves.
This is not robust evidence for reclaiming however, and it seems that this
methodology is not ideally suited to collected the relevant data.
9.11 Explanatory adequacy
Having raised questions about what would constitute explanatory adequacy, it
would be more than little methodologically question–begging to accept the
statistical analysis results as connecting straightforwardly with stances that
speakers orient to in interaction. To some extent, I accept the “cheat” that if lay
speakers explicitly take particular features to be orienting to particular attitudes,
then it is acceptable for linguists to do so in analyses, and the discourse from the
focus group does show a striking correspondence to the findings of the statistical
analysis. However, there are also points of difference. And in particular, there are
affect–laden points from the discourse that cannot be explained from the
statistical analysis, such as Laura’s remark that certain forms are
“depersonalising” in Extract 1. Stance research has attempted to map
frequencies and statistical results to social significance. In this case, seeking to
map the statistical results in this case to their social significance of
“depersonalis[ation]” would not be a departure from standard practice in stance
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research, but it is unclear whether the standard practice provides adequate
explanation.
9.12 Hypotheses revisited
It is now possible to revisit the hypotheses, and consider whether they should be
accepted or rejected.
My hypotheses, each with its corresponding H0 formulation, are as follows:
Hypothesis 1: I expect to see consistent, and statistically significant,
association between intra-linguistic features and acceptability judgements
H01 : There will be no statistically significant pattern in participants’
identification of intra-linguistic features and acceptability judgements.
Hypothesis 2: I expect intra-linguistic features that are identified as polite not
to be identified as offensive and vice-versa; and for intra-linguistic features
that are identified as polite to also be selected for friend use and
acquaintance use.
H02 : There will be no statistically significant relationship between
intra-linguistic features that are judged as polite, and how those features
are judged for offensiveness, friend use, and acquaintance use.
Grammatical pattern is a significant factor group for all the dependent variables,
and shows consistent acceptability patterns across the five dependent variables,
as discussed above. The H01 and H02 and can therefore be rejected, as the
evidence seems to confirm Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3: I expect to see evidence of linguistic features being used to mark
social distance: that is, consistent, and statistically significant, distinctions
between intra-linguistic features that are judged as being suitable for friend
use and those judged as being suitable for acquaintance use in the
statistical analysis, and reports of differential use for friends and
acquaintances in the discourse analysis.
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H03 : There will be no evidence of a significant relationship between
intra-linguistic features and social distance, in either the statistical analysis
or the discourse analysis.
The evidence for this hypothesis is mixed. As discussed above, there is some
evidence for distal use, but it is unclear how robust this data is. There is
discourse evidence for proximal use in the form of focus group participants saying
that they would use forms that would ordinarily be considered offensive if they
were speaking with someone they are close to, but there is no statistical evidence
to support generalising this observation.
In other words, there appears to be discursive evidence, but not statistical
evidence, for proximal use; and statistical, but not discursive, evidence for distal
use.
Hypothesis 4: I expect to see a statistically significant correlation between
number and politeness or ungrammaticality judgements for labels that
belong to the Type II (Jewish, Scottish) and Type III (Chinese) formal
lexical classes.
H04 : There will be no statistically significant correlation according to
formal lexical class and number.
The evidence for this hypothesis is mixed. Formal lexical class is significant for
ungrammaticality, and some singular individuating constructions with Type II and
III ethnonyms are judged ungrammatical to a greater extent than in plural
constructions or with Type I ethnonyms, but there appears to be interaction with
other factors.
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10 What is the status of stance–commitments? The semantic-
pragmatic distinction, and “what is said”
The discourse in Section 6 shows that ordinary language users have strong
intuitions that speakers are expressing commitments in using certain kinds of
lexicosyntactic constructions. However, it is not clear what the status of these
stance commitments are, and whether they should be thought of as semantic or
pragmatic content. In this section, I will explore whether we should consider
stance–commitments to be semantic commitments, or pragmatic discourse
strategies, and how they should be classified with regard to the Gricean
dichotomy between “what is said” and “what is implicated” or inferred
(Grice 1989, pp. 24-25).
The semantic–pragmatic distinction is a fixture of linguistics literature, although
many accounts have sought to problematise a strict demarcation. The
semantic–pragmatic distinction has been described in terms of:
• “what is said” versus “what is is implicated” or inferred (Grice 1989 pp.
24-25)
• “literal” meaning versus use (Bach, No Date; Grice 1989; and others)
• truth conditional content versus non-truth conditional content (Bach, No
Date; Grice 1989; and others)
• conceptual versus procedural content (Blakemore 1992; Wilson 2010)
However, it is not at all clear that all of these distinctions are isomorphic to each
other. In particular, Steedman and Petrick (2007) argue that, strictly speaking,
all utterances require inference; and in fairness, it should be noted that nearly all
neo-Griceans acknowledge “pragmatic intrusion” (Horn 2006) in the decoding of
utterances, but on Steedman and Petrick’s view, “pragmatic intrusion” is the
same cognitive process as the inference required for conversational implicature,
and so the two are reducible (2007). On this view, it is not clear how we should
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interpret the “what is said” versus “what is implicated” distinction, since these
seem to be reducible categories, but we might still want to retain a special
category for inferences that are calculable, or that seem to be part of lexical
significance. McConnell-Ginet’s work (2002, 2006, 2008) also problematises the
“literal” versus use distinction as we shall see in section 8, by arguing for
discursive history to be considered part of a word’s semantics.
Relevance-theoretic approaches such as that of Diane Blakemore (1992) and
Deidre Wilson (2010) have proposed that some lexical items — especially
discourse connectives — may serve to orient interlocutors to a particular
argument; that is, the content expressed by such lexical items is procedural, not
conceptual. I have not adopted a relevance-theoretic approach here, and for
reasons of brevity will not explore all these debates fully. However, it should be
noted that relevance-theoretic approaches problematise the relationship between
semantics and truth-conditional content.
In the next chapters, I will argue that stance–commitments may problematise an
attempt to maintain a strict demarcation between semantics and pragmatics
(cf. Bach, No Date).17 In particular, I will argue that stance–commitments do
contribute to “what is said”, and do contribute to lexical significance. In this
section, I will explore conventional implicatures, and why these are not
appropriate ways to think about stance–commitments.
10.1 Conventional implicatures
We might think that stance–commitments are conventional implicatures
(henceforth, CIs), because lay speakers have a strong intuition that some forms
are insulting by default, sometimes even regardless of the context.
Grice defines CIs as implicatures that arise because of the conventionalised
meaning of an expression, and which are not truth-conditional (1989, p. 25), and
gives the example
17Hat tip to Ronnie Cann for helpful comments on this section.
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(8) He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave. (1989, p. 25.)
However, later approaches have generally considered cases like therefore to be
truth-conditional, rather than CIs — that is, if bravery is not connected to
Englishness, then Grice’s example seems to be false, rather than simply
infelicitous.
Consequently, Potts considers (2003, 2005) that many of the cases that Grice
considered CIs are in fact truth-conditional, but that certain classes of
expressions might still be CIs. In particular, he considers parentheticals and
expressives, and it is this latter class that is relevant here. However, it is worth
noting that the class of expressives18 Potts considers are “contentless”, such as
damn and lovely — that is, they serve only to express affect.
Following Potts (2003, 2005), one could argue that CIs express stance. For
example (from Potts 2005, p. 7), the following sentence expresses a negative
stance towards lawn-mowing
(9) I have to mow the damn lawn.
Potts argues that if someone said (2) and did like mowing the lawn, one would
not respond by saying “that’s not true!”, and this shows that the negative stance
is not part of the truth-conditions of the sentence. However, he does note that
this negative stance is a commitment of sorts, as one would be unwise to respond
to the speaker by telling them that they really do love lawn-mowing.
However, we might reasonably question Potts’s claims with regard to the
challengeability of sentences containing CIs. Potts seems to be correct in the
intuition that challenging the truth or falsity of a sentence containing high affect
terms seems pragmatically problematic. For example, if we take the gays as
expressing a negative stance — following the discourse evidence in Section 6 —
18Although Potts speaks of expressive content, and other linguists and philosophers of language
speak of affective content, I assume that any difference between these terms is negligible.
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none of speaker B’s responses are highly problematic if they are attempts to
contradict speaker A’s negative stance.
(10) A: The gays are having a Pride march.
B: (i) #That’s not true!
(ii) #They’re not gay!
(iii)#No they aren’t!
We should note that the objection presented here is a different one from that
noted by Donnellan 1966, Strawson 1950, and others who note that the “that’s
not true!” diagnostic does not apply in cases of where an ordinary referring
expression simply fails. So it would be perfectly acceptable to say:
(11) A: The gays are having a Pride march.
B: (i) No they aren’t — it’s actually an impromptu folk music
festival.
(ii) That’s not true — they couldn’t get Council permission this
year.
I should be noted that in these examples what is challenged is the whether or not
the referent set of the gays are in fact having a Pride march, not speaker A’s
stance.
However, there does not appear to be anything wrong with challenging the
stance that a speaker is committed to, rather than the truth-value. Potts seems
to be conflating the pragmatic unacceptability of “that’s not true!” with
utterances that are pragmatically acceptable but possibly interactionally
dispreferred because of politeness norms, expectations of formality or informality,
attention to face, or similar concerns. If speaker B thinks that speaker A is not in
fact anti-gay, then the following examples all seem to be pragmatically and
semantically acceptable, although in certain contexts they might be
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face-threatening or inappropriately formal/informal:
(12) A: The gays are having a Pride march.
B: (i) But you’re not anti-gay.
(ii) I don’t think that’s an appropriate way to speak.
(iii) Dude, not cool.
This suggests that the problem with the “that’s not true!” diagnostic is not one
of presupposition (cf Strawson 1950 and others) or of attributive uses
(cf Donnellan 1966), but a specific problem with attempting to use “that’s not
true!” to challenge the whole sentence containing an apparent–CI.
So, contra Potts, perhaps the “that’s not true!” diagnostic is not conceptually
adequate for CIs. This diagnostic seems to be relying on the assumption that
each sentence expresses only one at-issue proposition. It may not be felicitous to
challenge the truth of something that is not the main point of a given sentence,
but that need not mean that the expression is not truth-conditional. Arguing this
view Bach (1999), gives the CI thesis in terms of the relationship to truth
conditions:
(13) CI thesis: “A proposition is a conventional implicature of an utterance
just in case (a) the speaker (speaking seriously) is committed to the
truth of the proposition, (b) which proposition that is depends upon the
(or a) conventional meaning of some particular linguistic device in the
utterance, but (c) the falsity of that proposition is compatible with the
truth of the utterance” (Bach 1999, p. 331).
Bach’s formulation of the CI thesis highlights a degree of ambiguity regarding
what is meant by “what is said” and how we should know if a something is part
of “what is said”, since the “that’s not true!” diagnostic does not seem to be
adequate. He proposes a different diagnostic instead, the IQ test, noting that
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apparent–CIs are preserved in indirect quotation:
(14) IQ test: An element of a sentence contributes to what is said in an
utterance of that sentence if and only if there can be an accurate and
complete indirect quotation of the utterances (in the same language)
which includes that element, or a correspondent element, in the
‘that’-clause that specifies what is said (Bach 1999, p. 340).
Bach argues that apparent–CIs are in fact truth conditional and part of “what is
said”, but it may be infelicitous to attempt to challenge the whole sentence with
”that’s not true!” because sentences containing apparent–CIs express more than
one proposition, and the proposition being challenged may not be the main point
of the sentence (the at-issue content). This argument explains examples (3) and
(4) above. On Bach’s view, the gays are having a Pride march expresses both
that the referent set of The gays are engaging in Pride march, and that the
speaker disapproves. Parenthetically, we should perhaps note a degree of
ambiguity: it is unclear whether the negative stance is restricted to the referent
set of the gays or whether it extends to the Pride march as well.19
Bach also notes that some of the content expressed by a sentence containing
apparent–CIs may be second–order speech acts: that is, speech acts which
modify that manner of delivery. Bach does not argue that these are part of
“what is said”, but he does note that these are reducible, through Speech Act
Theory. Other apparent–CIs, he argues, are reducible to “what is said”.
Potts gives a rule for CI and at-issue meaning which suggests he is committed to
a strict dichotomy between the two types of lexical content.
(15) “No lexical item contributes both an at-issue and a CI meaning”
(2005, p. 7)
19Of course there is also a common-sense constraint on the ambiguity — people who have a
negative stance towards gay people are likely to also have a negative stance towards Pride, but
the reverse need not be true.
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However, it seems that, for example, lexical items which are “semantically
double-barreled” (Zwicky 2003, p. 83) are precisely the kind of terms that could
be contributing both affective and at-issue meaning.20
It seems that a crucial question here is what sort of content Potts imagines
at-issue content to be, and whether types of content are reducible, as Bach
suggests.
10.2 Are stance–commitments reducible?
I will adopt Bach’s analysis of the reducibility of CIs here. The question then
arises of whether Bach’s IQ test applies to the lexicosyntactic constructions that
are taken as expressing stance:
(16) a. Ada: The gays are having a Pride march.
bIQ Emmy: Ada said that the gays are having a Pride march.
And a “real-life” example (from Daily Mail 2009):
(17) Carol Thatcher, speaking about Jo-Wilfried Tsonga: You also have to
consider the frogs. You know, that froggy golliwog guy.
Adrian ChilesIQ: Carol Thatcher said that Jo-Wilfried Tsonga is a froggy
golliwog.
Since it is possible to read (8)b such that Emmy is not committed to sharing
Ada’s negative stance21, it seems that this example passes the IQ test. This
point seems to be reinforced by the example with higher affect terms such as
froggy golliwog, where we do not take Adrian Chiles to be sharing Carol
Thatcher’s stance.
20It should be noted that Zwicky 2003 does not comment on the semantic or pragmatic
mechanisms that might underpin “double-barrel[ling]” (2003, p. 83).
21Examples (8)a and (8)b do show the scope ambiguity that is noted above but, but since it
is present in (8)a, rather than introduced by the indirect quotation, it does not seem fatal to my
argument.
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Zwicky also notes that lexical “double-barrel[ling]” (2003, p. 83) has the effect
of expressing multiple propositions, as Bach suggests:
“The guys in the pickup truck who shouted ‘Faggot!’ at me in front
of the Palo Alto post office one day were saying, to rephrase it all in
milder terms, that I was a gay man ... and that they disapproved of
gay men” (Zwicky 2003, pp. 82-82).
Consequently, since it seems that Bach’s argument applies to the lexicosyntactic
constructions that express stance, such as those in Sections 5 and 6, as well as to
Potts’s examples, it seems reasonable to consider them to be part of “what is
said” — that is, a truth-conditional semantic commitment. As we noted above,
however, there is considerable ambiguity as to what this means, especially if the
“what is said” versus what is inferred categories are reducible. In the next
section, I will consider how discursive history impacts on this question.
11 What is the status of stance–commitments? A look at
discursive history
McConnell-Ginet 2002, 2006, 2008 argues that the semantic of many words are
underspecified and shaped by discursive history. In particular, she focuses on
definitions of marriage such as:
(18) Marriage1: “[T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife”
(Defense of Marriage Act 1996, Section 3).
(19) Marriage2: “Marriage, for civil purposes, is the lawful union of two
persons to the exclusion of all others” (Civil Marriage Act 2005 [Loi sur
le mariage civil], Section 2).
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(20) Marriage3: “A marriage is always made up of two people who are
prepared to swear that only the other one snores” (Pratchett 2000,
p. 122).
Some of the definitions listed above would include marriages that other definitions
exclude. McConnell-Ginet argues that struggles over the semantics of marriage
are also struggles over the institution of marriage (2002, 2006, 2008), which
accords certain legal rights and responsibilities to married people that unmarried
people do not have. Struggles over marriage carry with them sociopolitical
baggage which has become discursively associated with the word marriage, and
which people may have strong investments in claiming or rejecting (2006, 2008).
A comparable case would also be the struggles over the meaning of queer, which
for some speakers is synonymous with gay, and for other speakers, it can act as
an umbrella term which can refer not only gay, lesbian, and bisexual people, but
also includes number of non– or anti–heteronormative identities and behaviours,
such as trans people, gender binary nonconformers, polyamory/polyfidelity,
asexual people, intersex people, and so on (cf Anon. 1990, p. 10;
Cameron & Kulick 2003, p. 28; Zwicky 1997a, p. 23). The association of queer
with a move to “repackage” categories that were traditionally associated with
“preference” to categories that are defined in terms of positions with regard to
heteronormativity associated queer with a particular type of political discourse for
many speakers (cf Anon 1990, Zwicky 1997b).
In other words, the claim is that many words’ referents cannot be thought of as
“moderate-sized specimens of dry goods” (Austin 1962, p. 8), but rather that
“In a real sense, [...] many words are queer; that is, they resist definition and it is
their definitional intractability that gives them much of their real bite.”
(McConnell-Ginet 2002 p. 138).
Motivated by the need to consider the baggage associated with sociopolitical and
discursive history, McConnell-Ginet proposes a framework for analysing lexical
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significance in terms of three underlying components (2008, p. 508):
semantic representation: “part of what language users ‘know’ when they have
fully acquired words” (p. 508).
reference: the selction of an object in the external world by a linguistic
expression.
conceptual baggage: social significance which becomes discursively associated
with a linguistic expression.
This leaves the question of which component best describes
stance–commitments.
11.1 Semantic representations
As McConnell-Ginet notes (2008), what semantic representations look like is
controversial among linguists, but they probably include some consideration of
truth-conditions (2008, p. 509), and,
Linguists have often assumed that semantic representations
(or semantic knowledge more generally) would include all that would
be needed to calculate entailments licensed by sentences in which
a word occurs (2008, p. 509. Emphasis original.).
An argument that stance–commitments are truth-conditional would commit one
to the view that they belong at least partly to the realm of semantic
representation. It should be noted that a semantic externalist view complicates
this model significantly, as McConnell-Ginet notes: on the view of folks like
Putnam who argue that meaning is fixed by a weighted division of linguistic
labour, in which “experts” determine the meaning of terms such as beech and
elm, (Putnam 1981, p. 18). However, a queer-theoretic response to such a view
would be to ask what sort of person would count as an “expert” in determining
the meaning of terms such as marriage, queer, wife, and others. Kitzinger
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(2005), for example, notes that a woman speaking of “my wife” can cause major
interactional difficulties.
11.2 Reference
The relationship between stance and reference is somewhat complex. In the case
of marriage discussed above, it seems that, at least some of the time, stance
might fix the referent, in that at least part of the dispute over the meaning of
marriage is whether its refers to only to partnerships involving different-sex
partners; or whether it can refer to same-sex partners also.
In other cases, however, it does not seem that stance affects reference at all. For
example, the referents set to be the same in both pairs of sentences below,
although each sentence seems to convey a different stance:
(21) a. Edith, who is a Catholic, goes to the library.
b. The Catholic, Edith, goes to the library.
(22) a. The black students write essays.
b. Black students write essays.
Similarly, the poll results below suggest that people have dramatically different
response to homosexuals and gay men and lesbians, even though it seems
implausible to suggest that respondents imagine the referent sets of these lexical
items to be different. The poll was done in the United States in the run up to
the repeal of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” rule that prevented LGBT people from
serving openly in the US armed forces. Respondents were asked either “Do you
think homosexuals should be allowed to serve openly in the military?”, or “Do
you think gay men and lesbians should be allowed to serve openly in the
military?”, with rather more people answering that they favoured “gay men and
lesbians” serving openly.
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Allowed to serve openly
Homosexuals Gay Men & Lesbians
Favor 44% 58%
Oppose 42% 28%
Table 13: From CBSNews/New York Times Poll, 2010
11.3 Conceptual baggage
This may be the most appropriate description for stance–commitments.
According to McConnell-Ginet’s argument (2002, 2006, 2008), conceptual
baggage consists of the set of assumptions that is discursively as socially
associate with a term, but is not part of what that term is taken to mean
truth-conditionally. This set of assumptions are part of a salient sociopolitical
discourse,
For example, when David Laws was discovered to have been claiming
parliamentary expenses in order to pay rent for in a home he shared with his
partner, he fell foul of parliamentary rules that prevent parliamentarians from
renting accommodation from a partner or family member. His defence depended
on the definition of partner, which is defined in the The Green Book, which
governs how Members of Parliament may claim expenses, as:
“Partner means one of a couple, whether of the same sex or of the
opposite sex (the other being a Member [of Parliament]) who
although not married to each other or civil partners are living together
and treat each other as spouses” (The Green Book 2009, p. 17).
Laws claimed that
“At no point did I consider myself to be in breach of the rules which
in 2009 defined partner as one of a couple who although not married
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to each-other or civil partners are living together and treat each-other
as spouses’.
Although we were living together we did not treat each other as
spouses. For example we do not share bank accounts and indeed
have separate social lives.” (The Telegraph 2010).
That is, Laws’s claim is much like McConnell-Ginet’s (2008) and Kitzinger’s
(2005): words like partner and spouse suggest to the hearer that a number of
things are the case, for example, that the spouses/partners are in a long-term
relationship, that they live together, that they have certain responsibilities
towards each other, that they have friends in common, that they do not profit
directly from each other’s domestic expenses, and so on. However, Laws seems
to have been relying on the idea that these are constitutive of a partnership, and
so since he and his partner had separate social lives, they did not “count” as
partners. McConnell-Ginet, however, points out that these discursively associated
ideas are not truth-conidtional: that is, many people might consider it slightly
surprising, but not contradictory or semantically problematic22 to say something
like:
(23) My partner and I do not live together.
McConnell-Ginet also notes that conceptual baggage is distinct from Gricean or
neo-Gricean implicature (2008, p. 513), since the inferences that interlocutors
orient to need not be ones they are consciously aware of:
“The parsimonious–minded might well think of saying that such
conceptual baggage should be considered a matter of Gricean
implicature — what the speaker means as distinguished from
22It happens to be true in my case that the person I describe as “my partner” is not a person
I live with, and I find no particular interactional difficulty arises from this point, which contrasts
sharply with KITZINGER’S observation of the interactional difficulty that may arise if a woman
speaks of “my wife”. It may be that some inferences are more salient than others.
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what she says. After all, we need the notion of speakers meaning for
other reasons. But this move will not do the trick in general, because
conceptual baggage can trigger inferences even if the speaker does
not intend those inferences to be drawn, perhaps has not even
considered them explicitly” (2008, p. 513. Emphasis original).
That is, it seems to be a crucial aspect of Gricean implicature that implicatures
are a matter of communicative intention.23 However, in this case it seems that it
would be helpful to have a rigorous account of when inferences are invited, as
intention is a mental state and as such interlocutors have no direct access to it.
One advantage of Steedman and Petrick’s approach is that it allows us to reduce
communicative intention to rule-based inference (2007, Sections 4.6-4.7); they
discuss the cases such as You’re a fine friend!, and how the hearer can infer,
without needing to be told explicitly, that what the speaker intends is that they
are a lousy friend from rules such as (from 2007, Sections 4.6):
(24) “If X say p to Y and Y suppose ¬p , then Y continues to suppose ¬p
and supposes that ¬p is not common ground.”
The distinction between conceptual baggage and implicature is clearer in cases
such as the following Liz Feldman quote (cited in Zwicky 2011)
(25) “It’s very dear to me, the issue of gay marriage. Or, as I like to call it:
‘marriage’. You know, because I had lunch this afternoon, not gay lunch.
I parked my car, I didn’t gay park it.”
Here the comedian Liz Feldman exploits the tension between conceptual baggage
and implicature. Gay marriage carries with it the baggage that is associated with
socially conservative opposition to same-sex marriage, and that much of that
opposition is focussed on opposing the use of marriage for same-sex couples.
23Thanks to Rob Truswell for helpful comments on this point.
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However the term gay park has no political currency of a parallel sort, so an
inference is triggered that there is a “gay” way of parking, or that the manner in
which a person parks their car can be attributed to their being gay.
The tension between the various ways of “packaging” (cf. McConnell-Ginet
2008, p. 516) marriage may be part of a process of semantic change. Political
instability of this kind can trigger linguistic instability which can in turn trigger
semantic shift. McConnell-Ginet (2008, p. 516) outlines the types of semantic
change that can occur when conceptual baggage is contested:




Table 14: Typology of (possibly contested) changes in lexical significance (from
McConnell-Ginet 2008, p. 516).
If McConnell-Ginet’s arguments and mine are both correct, and
stance–commitments are a special subcategory of conceptual baggage, then
definitional struggles are struggles over stance. This is an empirical claim, not a
theoretical one, and it would need to be clarified and tested. That is, it would be
important to know whether, for example reclaiming does in fact occur in
situations where the conceptual baggage, but not the reference, is contested.
11.4 Conversational implicatures
Although McConnell-Ginet argues that conceptual baggage is distinct from
conversational implicature (2008, p. 513), it will be important examine the
notion of conversational implicatures, and similar approaches, in order to
understand how they are distinct, and in order to clarify the question that was
raised above regarding the reducibility of “what is said” and “what is implicated”.
HP Grice proposes a descriptive framework for inference work in communication
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(1989). These context-dependent inferences are conversational implicatures
(henceforth, simply implicatures). They are calculable — is it possible to
determine the intended implicature from the context; and defeasible — the
implicature can be explicitly cancelled.
In the Gricean paradigm, implicatures are generated through the assumption that
speakers adhere to certain maxims which are given as:
Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required. Do not make
your contribution more informative than is required.
Quality: Do not say what you believe to be false, or for which you lack adequate
evidence.
Relation: Be relevant.
Manner: Avoid obscurity of expression. Avoid ambiguity. Be brief. Be orderly.
(From 1989, pp. 26-27.)
Additionally, Grice proposes an overarching descriptive principle:
The Cooperative Principle: “Make your conversational contribution
such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted
purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged”
(Grice 1989 p. 26).
On Grice’s view, the maxims are descriptive of the assumptions that speakers use
to reason about discursive interaction. For example:
(26) A: My member of parliament lacks principle.
B: She is a Liberal Democrat.
In theory, there is no obvious connection between the member of parliament’s
lack of principle and their party membership. However, Grice argues that the
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co-operative speaker will adhere to the maxims, and say only things that are
relevant, informative, and appropriate for the purposes of the talk. The hearer
can therefore infer a causal connection between speaker B pointing out the party
allegiance in response to the complain about lack of principle; and in the context
of widespread public displeasure with the Liberal Democrats’ reversal of a
number of core election pledges, such an implicature would be highly salient. The
implicature is also cancellable — speaker A could reply:
(27) A: It’s nothing to do with her party. All politicians are unprincipled!
Other neo-Gricean theorists (cf, for example, Horn 2006) have sought to
condense and clarify the maxims. Steedman and Petrick (2007), however,
propose a non-Gricean view of inference, according to which all speech acts
require rule-based inference, but no maxims — all that is necessary is a
procedure for rule-substitution and a notion of affordance. They further suggest
that it is not necessary for a speaker to recognise intention or illocutionary force
associated with particular discourse moves in order to be able to reason about
and plan the next dialogue move.
One might argue that stance–commitments seem like implicatures because they
are defeasible depending on what one knows about the speaker
(Ronnie Cann, personal communication). Recall Extract 4, in which Laura and
James note that proximity may mitigate the insulting sense of “you’re a gay” if it
is addressed to a friend or sibling, and make it “in jest”. If stance–commitments
are calculable and defeasible based on communicative intention, this seems like
good grounds for considering them to be a special class of implicatures.
However, lay speakers seem to be able to calculate stance–commitments when
they have very little knowledge about the speaker, and indeed the stance itself
may serve as a basis for beliefs or presumed knowledge about the speaker. For
example, when a German newspaper described the then UK Foreign Minister
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Malcolm Rifkind as “der Jude Rifkind” (“the Jew Rifkind”), the report was met
with international criticism (New York Times 1997), and both the journalist
Michaela Wiegel and the newspaper in which the report originally appeared were
accused of anti-semitism and Nazism by media commentators and members of
the public who presumably knew very little about her.
(28) “As though he was not fully convinced by his own speech, the Jew
Rifkind, ironically apologetic, concluded with the German phrase by
Luther: ‘Here I stand, I cannot do other’ ” (cited in New York Times
1997).
So in this case it is not clear that the stance–commitment really is defeasible
based on what one knows about the speaker, and indeed. One might also
reasonably query what it would mean for the stance–commitment in such an
utterance to be defeasible. Traditionally, defeasibility means that a speaker can
truthfully claim that the inference is not part of the literal meaning of their
utterance, for example:
(29) Speaker A: Jocelyn Bell discovered pulsars. Her male supervisor got a
Nobel Prize.
Speaker B: So you think gender was a factor?
Speaker A: I didn’t say that.
Here Speaker A implicates that there is a gendered factor in the allocation of the
Nobel Prize, but this is not part of the “narrow” or “literal” meaning of her
utterance. She can therefore explicitly deny that she intended such an
implicature to be drawn.
However, we perhaps should note that some cancellations are more plausible than
others, because of our social knowledge and assumptions, but intention alone
does not seem to be an adequate explanation on its own. McConnell-Ginet’s
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approach problematises our understanding of “narrow” or “literal” semantics by
introducing conceptual baggage into the mix, which provides the explanatory
power that is necessary in these situations. For example, if it is part of the
semantics of the Jew Rifkind that such an expression commits the speaker to an
anti-semitic stance, then cancellation by the speaker would seem discursively
implausible. This complicates our understanding of semantic and pragmatic
content, since defeasible utterances are generally taken to be pragmatic.
11.5 Reclamatory use
Arnold Zwicky notes that some terms, eg faggot that have high affective content
are semantically “double-barreled” (Zwicky 2003, p. 84) in that they incorporate
both a referential sense and a disparaging sense. In particular, Zwicky focuses on
positive, or reclamatory, uses of faggot, and their connection with the disparaging
and referential components. Zwicky argues that reclamatory uses of faggot are
possible in that “lingering nastiness in the word can be a source of power, even
strength” (2003, p. 84). For this use to be possible, however, the disparaging use
must also, at the very least, be in circulation, because the reclamatory use
depends on the disparaging use. This example highlights that reclaiming relies on
the continued sting of disparaging words. It seems to be crucial to reclaiming
that there is an element of using “the enemy’s words”:
“...QUEER can be a rough word but it is also a sly and ironic weapon
we can steal from the homophobe’s hands and use against him”
(Anon. 1990, p. 10. Emphasis original.)
Queer present an example of the mainstreaming of a term which was once used
almost exclusively as a term of abuse. We now have queer theory, queer
linguistics, and queer studies: these are all mainstream usages in which queer
seems to have lost its derogatory sting, and consequently also to have lost its
“transgressive” edge (Zwicky 1997b) in certain contexts (but see Queen 2001,
pp. 82-4) although, queer can still be used to insult in other contexts.
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This raises a curious double bind. If reclamatory force is derived from disparaging
sting, the mainstreaming of reclaimed words may make them less
confrontationally useful — they may not longer be “sly ironic weapon[s]” (Anon.
1990, p. 10). Cameron writes:
“An important part of the meaning of an insult is [...] what the
receiver takes the speaker’s intention to have been. We [...] can
reclaim certain words amongst ourselves without touching their
status as insults” (Cameron 1985, p. 78).
On Cameron’s view, it seems impossible to reclaim with complete success, since
the words one might seek to reclaim are intended to hurt; but the other side of
this coin is that if a word does lose its hurtful sting in certain contexts, it may
lose its confrontational power.
Reclamatory language can be explained by applying McConnell-Ginet’s (2002,
2006, 2008) analysis to lexical items that have traditionally been seen as
insulting. If McConnell-Ginet is correct in her analysis of the influence of stance
on semantic shift, then reclamatory language use might be fertile ground for
empirical study to verify her argument.
12 “What have experts ever done for us?” Speech acts,
knowledge, and performativity
Since Austin’s analysis of speech acts (1975), it is no longer possible to maintain
a strict dichotomy between speech and action. On Austin’s analysis, utterances
of the form I bet, I promise cannot be described in narrowly literal or
truth-conditional terms, but also comprises what they do in context. Crucially, in
saying them, an action is effected. Speech acts have three components:
Locutionary act: conveying information (eg, that a promise/bet has been
made)
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Illocutionary act: the action done by the utterance (betting, promising).
Perlocutionary effect: intended or unintended consequence of the speech act
on the thoughts and feelings of the hearers (eg, surprising the hearer with
your promise.)
(Austin 1975).
Later work in speech act theory and pragmatics more broadly have problematised
the relationship between these three components, and between utterances and
speech acts. In particular, they have argued that speech acts cannot necessarily
be clearly individuated. For example, depending on the relationship between the
interlocutors and the context of the interaction, the utterance below could either
some friendly advice (if the interlocutors are speaking informally), or a threat (if
the speaker is the employer of the hearer).
(30) I advise you not to be late again.
Geis (1995) also argues that the individuation of speech acts depends on social
factors — such as the relationship between speakers, the context of the
interaction — not linguistic ones, and so speech acts are more correctly viewed
as social acts. However, previous work on stance and indexicality shows that
social features such as speaker relationships and attitudes as well as demographic
information can influence linguistic features, especially phonetic features, lexical
choice, and as my current work shows, lexicosyntactic features. This being the
case, it is perhaps more correct to say that the individuation of speech acts
depends on sociolinguistic, but not intralinguistic conditions.
In this chapter and the subsequent one, I will attempt to sketch out how one
might think of the connection between the sociolinguistic notions that have been
discussed so far, and semantic and pragmatic accounts of speech acts (Austin
1975, Geis 1995)
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12.1 Speech act structure and the distribution of knowledge
Grice (1989) and neo-Gricean approaches to discourse are based on speakers
exploiting social and real-world knowledge in various ways to make implicit
connections between statements (Horn 2006). Hearers must then notice that
there is an anomaly in what has been said, and supply the missing information.
However, Steedman (Steedman & Petrick 2007) and McConnell-Ginet (2002,
2006, 2008), although working from rather different approaches, reach a similar
conclusion, which is that salience is a crucial notion in discourse.
Steedman, working from a computational semantics and pragmatics perspective,
argues for a rule-driven computational account of discourse in which the relevant
rules are determined by what is salient in a given context.
McConnell-Ginet, working at the intersection of semantics and queer linguistics,
argues that some words index particular politically salient stances. and it is
reasonable to consider these as part of a word’s semantics.
In both of these accounts, saliences plays a crucial role. While it is difficult to
speak of queer linguistics as being a cohesive body of theory with agreed
principles (see, for example, the debates Campbell-Kibler et al 2002), it is worth
noting the idea that ordinary speakers can dispute the meanings of words, which
pervades the work of linguists working in this tradition such as McConnell-Ginet
(2006, 2008). This is in sharp contrast to the work of philosophers of language
such as Putnam who argue that the division of linguistic labour within speech
communities is such that experts have a special role in fixing the meanings of
particular roles (Putnam 1981). Putnam argues that, if an ordinary speaker uses
elm of a tree that a botanist would call a beech, then the ordinary speaker is
incorrect, because the botanist has a privileged role in the fixing of words like elm
and beech (1981).
However, it is unclear what sort of person would be an expert about the meaning
of marriage, or queer, or the words used in this the present research: black,
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Jewish, gay, etc. A point highlighted by McConnell-Ginet 2006 is that part of the
political dispute with regard to the semantics of marriage is who is licensed to
comment on the meaning of marriage, with opponents of same-sex marriage
often arguing that same-sex marriage is impossible or oxymoronic by definition,
and pointing to, as they see it, authorities such as dictionaries, the Bible, clergy,
etc. Proponents of same-sex marriage, by contrast, may argue that such
definitions are outdated or simply incorrect. In other words, the dispute is at least
in part about who is licensed to provide a definition of marriage; and more
broadly, of social kind terms in general.
It is not clear that this dispute extends to natural kind terms, and this would
require further research. However, in the present empirical and discourse enquiry,
we are concerned with terms such as gay, black and so on, which are social kind
terms. So my argument here is restricted to social kind terms, and I make no
claims about terms which might be regarded as natural kind terms (but see
Haslanger 2000).
In other words, disputes over lexical significance can occur at multiple levels, and
in order to make testable claims about these disputes, we must refine what is
meant by “disputes” and at what level we are seeking to investigate the claim.
13 Directions for future work
Reclamatory use
As discussed in Section 11.5, reclamatory language may be fertile ground for
future work, with a view to clarifying and testing McConnell-Ginet’s argument
and their consequences for the role of stance in semantic shift.
Computable models
I have attempted here to outline some of the problems with our current
approaches to stand research; a logical next step would be to attempt to clarify
stance further with a view to formalising the notion of stance and making it
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computable, so that it can be integrated into current ongoing research programs
of making discourse relations computable (see, for example, Jurafsky 2004,
Webber 2009).
Generics
Kamp and Reyle discuss the semantic difference between generics and ordinary
indefinite noun phrase constructions, in terms of propositions about “typical”
cases. (1993, p. 294). Since lay speaker ideologies may focus on whether or not
it is appropriate to consider certain social groups as cohesive or as having
“typical” members, it is possible that generics may constrain affect, and this
might be a fruitful avenue of further research.
Performativity and third–order indexicals
One might reasonably ask what counts as explanatory adequacy for saying that
something is a third–order indexical. On Johnstone & Kiesling’s schema,
performativity is achieved through the use of second– and third– order indexicals
(2008). The evidence they give for /aw/-monophthogization being third–order is
a combination of discursive and empirical evidence,and they specifically point to
stereotyping as evidence of performative use. However, this merely shifts the
question sideways, so to speak, since one might still reasonably ask what counts
as adequate proof that a feature has been stereotyped. Johnstone and Kiesling
offer the presence of “dahntahn” on lists of “Pittsburghese” lexemes on T-shirts
and other souvenirs.
It seems that there is much to be gained by clarifying the notion of indexicality
with regard to salience and explanatory adequacy. There may be evidence for
third–order indexical identity labels in mass media usage; for example, T-shirts
with the slogan “Marriage is so gay” or the use of the Twitter hashtag “#sogay”.
Page 131 of 146
Exam number: 6388940
14 Conclusion
The empirical evidence from lexicosyntactic variation and discourse analysis
suggests that stance is part of what speakers commit themselves to when they
utter a statement containing a semantically double-barrelled term, and the
degree of consistency with which affect seems to be associated with certain
grammatical patterns is particularly striking.
I have sketched out some methodological worries for researchers working on
stance, and enumerated some of definitional problems with our current notion of
stance. These methodological concerns serve as motivation to integrate stance
into semantic/pragmatic description.
I have also considered and what sorts of semantic/pragmatic description can
accommodate stance–commitments, and in particular, argued that we should
take seriously the idea that stance forms part of a word’s semantics by
constituting part of the “conceptual baggage” of a term, on McConnell-Ginet’s
tripartite analysis (2002, 2006, 2008). This in turn has consequences for
knowledge distribution for social kind terms, and disputes over meaning.
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17 Appendix I: Focus group sentence list
1. (a) Edith is a Catholic.
(b) Edith is Catholic.
(c) The Catholic, Edith, celebrates Christmas.
(d) Catholic Edith celebrates Christmas.
(e) Catholics celebrate Christmas.
(f) The Catholic people celebrate Christmas.
(g) The Catholics celebrate Christmas.
(h) Catholic people celebrate Christmas.
2. (a) Jack is a German.
(b) Jack is German.
(c) The German, Jack, celebrates New Year’s.
(d) German Jack celebrates New Year’s.
(e) German celebrate New Year’s.
(f) German people celebrate New Year’s.
(g) The German people celebrate New Year’s.
(h) The Germans celebrate New Year’s.
3. (a) Harry is a Chinese.
(b) Harry is Chinese.
(c) The Chinese, Harry, celebrates Chinese New Year.
(d) Chinese Harry celebrates Chinese New Year.
(e) Chinese celebrate Chinese New Year.
(f) Chinese people celebrate Chinese New Year.
(g) The Chinese people celebrate Chinese New Year.
(h) The Chinese celebrate Chinese New Year.
4. (a) Kim is an emo.
(b) Kim is emo.
(c) The emo, Kim, goes to gigs.
(d) Emo Kim goes to gigs.
(e) Emos go to gigs.
(f) Emo people go to gigs.
(g) The emo people go to gigs.
(h) The emos go to gigs.
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5. (a) Alice is a Jew.
(b) Alice is Jewish.
(c) The Jew, Alice, celebrates Hanukkah.
(d) Jewish Alice celebrates Hanukkah.
(e) Jews celebrate Hanukkah.
(f) Jewish people celebrate Hanukkah.
(g) The Jewish people celebrate Hanukkah.
(h) The Jews celebrate Hanukkah.
6. (a) Charlotte is a lesbian.
(b) Charlotte is a lesbian woman.
(c) Charlotte is lesbian.
(d) The lesbian, Charlotte, celebrates Pride.
(e) Lesbian Charlotte celebrates Pride.
(f) The lesbian woman, Charlotte, celebrates Pride.
(g) The lesbians celebrate Pride.
(h) Lesbians celebrate Pride.
(i) The lesbian women celebrate Pride.
(j) Lesbian women celebrate Pride.
7. (a) Bob is a Scot.
(b) Bob is Scottish.
(c) The Scot, Bob, celebrates Hogmanay.
(d) Scottish Bob celebrates Hogmanay.
(e) Scots celebrate Hogmanay.
(f) Scottish people celebrate Hogmanay.
(g) The Scottish people celebrate Hogmanay.
(h) The Scots celebrate Hogmanay.
8. (a) Georgina is a black.
(b) Georgina is black.
(c) The black, Georgina, celebrates Hogmanay.
(d) Black Georgina celebrates Hogmanay.
(e) Blacks celebrate Hogmanay.
(f) Black people celebrate Hogmanay.
(g) The black people celebrate Hogmanay.
(h) The blacks celebrate Hogmanay.
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9. (a) Darren is a gay.
(b) Darren is a gay man.
(c) Darren is gay.
(d) The gay, Darren, celebrates Pride.
(e) Gay Darren celebrates Pride.
(f) The gay man, Darren, celebrates Pride.
(g) The gays celebrate Pride.
(h) Gays celebrate Pride.
(i) The gay men celebrate Pride.
(j) Gay men celebrate Pride.
10. (a) Imogen is a white.
(b) Imogen is white.
(c) The white, Imogen, celebrates Hogmanay.
(d) White Imogen celebrates Hogmanay.
(e) White celebrate Hogmanay.
(f) White people celebrate Hogmanay.
(g) The white people celebrate Hogmanay.
(h) The whites celebrate Hogmanay.
11. (a) Fred is a Protestant.
(b) Fred is Protestant.
(c) The Protestant, Fred, celebrates Christmas.
(d) Protestant Fred celebrates Christmas.
(e) Protestants celebrate Christmas.
(f) Protestant people celebrate Christmas.
(g) The Protestant people celebrate Christmas.
(h) The Protestants celebrate Christmas.
12. (a) Louise is a gay.
(b) Louise is a gay woman.
(c) Louise is gay.
(d) The gay, Louise, celebrates Pride.
(e) Gay Louise celebrates Pride.
(f) The gay woman, Louise, celebrates Pride.
(g) The gay women celebrate Pride.
(h) Gay women celebrate Pride.
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18 Appendix II: Transcription conventions
Laura: Colon follows speaker name
@ Laughter.
@yeah Laughter during a word.
# Unintelligible. One symbol per syllable.
#yeah Uncertain. One symbol per word.
wor– Truncated word.
— Truncated intonational unit.
Capital letter Start of the intonational unit or “sentence”.
(Note that I have also used capital letters for names of people
and events etc, for grammatical clarity).
. Boundary, or end of intonational unit or “sentence”.
, Pause, but intonational unit or “sentence” continues.





5 Line number for reference.
((T = 2:30)) Duration of transcribed recording, in minutes and second.
((Start/End at T = 2:30)) Start or end time for an extracted transcription.
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